

How we get along

THE DIVERSITY STUDY OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 2020

Appendix

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APPENDIX A:

WHAT WE KNOW

DIVERSITY

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

Previous academic research

The body of academic literature concerning diversity is truly vast. The term has been applied in multiple contexts, each representing significant sub-fields of academic study. A full review of these materials would need many more pages than constitute this report. For example, a study of academic literature concerning diversity within the business world, produced by the UK Government's Department of Business Innovation and Skills, is nearly 70 pages long (BIS 2013). A study of diversity within the health research community (merely one aspect of academic research, itself a significant sub-field of diversity studies) produced a working paper that is over 100 pages long (Chambers et al 2017). Within the British context, studies of multiculturalism (in sum, the presence or support for several distinct cultural or ethnic groups within a society) and the application of the values of multiculturalism within UK Government policymaking represents another enormous body of academic and policy work. (For a detailed overview, see Taylor-Gooby and Waite 2014.) British academic Tariq Modood has been central to our understanding of multiculturalism (the presence or support for distinct ethnic or cultural groups in a society) and his work has been cited thousands of times: his entry on "multiculturalism" in the *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, one of dozens of articles and papers on the subject he has authored, has been cited in over 2,000 academic works (see Modood 2007). Given the scope of diversity studies, the aim of this review is to summarise examples that are relevant to the study of relations between individuals and groups from ethnic, national and religious communities, with a focus on local communities. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines "diversity" as "the state of being diverse". "Diverse" is defined as "showing a great deal of variety". We adopt a common-sense definition of "diversity" developing these definitions.

Given our focus on communities, one suitable starting point (among the many available) is Robert Putnam's well-known lecture on diversity and community delivered in 2006 and published a year later: *E Pluribus Unum* ["out of many, one"]: *Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century* (Putnam 2007). Putnam's lecture provides the departure point for a host of subsequent studies (see, among many others, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Laurence and Bentley 2016; Piekut and Valentine 2016; Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018; and Lymperopoulou 2020).

Putnam

In his lecture, Putnam considered increases in ethnic diversity in many advanced countries, driven largely by immigration, with a focus on the US. Putnam argued that, in the long-term, immigration and diversity would be likely to be beneficial to society – as he describes, “an important social asset” (2007: 138). However, in the short-term, Putnam argued that immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social solidarity and social capital. This position of Putnam’s is sometimes known as the “constrict claim”. According to Putnam, one consequence of ethnic diversity is a tendency for residents of all races to “hunker down”; in other words, to look inwards, detach and become increasingly separate – to become constricted. In Putnam’s own words: “Trust (even of one’s own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, and friends fewer” (2007: 137).

Social contact and social solidarity, as applied by Putnam, are both complex concepts, with much academic writing devoted to both. For the purposes of this report, we may think of them as the quantity and quality of interactions and connections with other people living locally. Two dominant theories have been used to discuss and debate these social connections: “contact” and “conflict”. According to contact theory (sometimes known as the “contact hypothesis”), and probably confirming most common-sense understandings of such situations, trust between people from different backgrounds increases when contact between them increases. According to proponents of this theory (including those influenced by Gordon Allport’s foundational work *The Nature of Prejudice* (1979), first published in 1954), diversity reduces ethnocentric attitudes and fosters trust and solidarity towards people from other backgrounds (2007: 142). Such sentiment is sometimes referred to as “out-group” attitudes (see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

In opposition to contact theory stands “conflict theory”. Related to the notion of constriction, conflict theory posits that diversity leads to increased competition for limited resources (employment, housing, etc.), which in turn leads to the distrust of others (or to use the more technical term, “out-group distrust”) and a tendency to “hunker down” (or to use the more technical phrase “in-group solidarity”). Hence, social contact and social solidarity.

Putnam’s influential lecture also describes the differences between “bonding” social capital (ties to people from similar backgrounds) and “bridging” social capital (ties to people from other backgrounds). Putnam challenges the notion that as one grows, the other diminishes. For Putnam, bridging and bonding is not a zero-sum game. Putnam’s main argument is that research prior to 2006 had not focused on in-group attitudes (attitudes of members of a group towards each other) but on out-group attitudes (attitudes within a group towards another group). Further, he argued that researchers had presumed, but not firmly established, the links between in-group and out-group attitudes. In Putnam’s view, the evidence did not support the theory. In taking this position, Putnam

countered earlier research (e.g. Pettigrew and Tropp's influential and much-cited work), which had asserted the positive effects of contact between different ethnic groups within communities – to use the jargon, in-group contact at the local level (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Unsurprisingly, research following Putnam's lecture, whether supporting or challenging its main claims, now represents another giant block of academic work on diversity, with over 5,500 academic works citing it.

Among these, Kaufmann and Goodwin (2018), focus on two implications of diversity, as described by Putnam:

- withdrawal from community (the so-called “exit” route, sometimes manifesting as self-segregation, sometimes referred to as “White flight”); and
- negative attitudes towards immigration (the so-called “voice” route, sometimes manifesting as political support for anti-immigration parties).

According to Kaufmann and Goodwin, the “exit” route has received meta-analytic treatment, the analysis of multiple studies simultaneously (see van der Meer and Tolsma 2014), the “voice” route has not. Given this apparent gap, Kaufmann and Goodwin asked: How does rising ethnic diversity in the West affect perceptions of threat among native-born White majorities?

Like Putnam, they reject notions of a zero-sum game and instead posit how the competing claims of contact and threat theory might be reconciled by considering different geographic units. In the authors' own words:

The field needs to move beyond the zero-sum debate between contact and threat theory. Our metadata shows that both theories fit the data, but at different geographic scales. (2018: 121)

Of particular relevance to the present study is their finding, among other more highly technical aspects of their work, that “diversity levels relate to anti-immigration sentiment in a nonlinear way, [whereas] ethnic change has a linear association with threat” (2018: 121). In other words, it is not diversity per se, but the rate of change at the local that is more likely to determine the strength and direction of anti-immigration sentiment. Among Kaufmann and Goodwin's recommendations for future research, the authors suggest separate results for native born White samples and interactions between diversity and ethnicity, consideration of change as well as diversity and consideration of different units of populations (units in the 5,000-10,000 range and those over 100,000).

Whilst the present study is not of the exact same nature of Kaufmann and Goodwin's, we hope to have developed the understanding of diversity in the UK using the spirit of their recommendations. We surveyed UK-born White people, we examined attitudes and experiences

relating to diversity among minority ethnic and faith groups and we considered different geographic units: the local community (as perceived by respondents), local authorities, regions of England and Wales and both countries taken as a whole.

Other significant studies

Van der Meer and Tolsma describe a “cacophony of empirical findings” (Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014: 459). To attempt to reconcile the many competing voices (including those for and against contact and conflict theories), van der Meer and Tolsma adopt the term “social cohesion” rather than “social capital”. In their view, the former is “a more neutral and less contrived concept” (2014: 461). The authors undertake a meta-analysis, examine 90 empirical studies, and find that:

(a) there is consistent support for the constrict claim for aspects of social cohesion that are spatially bounded to neighborhoods (sic), (b) support for the constrict claim is more common in the United States than in other countries, and (c) ethnic diversity is not related to less interethnic social cohesion. (2014: 459)

In contrast to research which has supported Putnam’s position on diversity and trust, in the long-term at least:

Heterogeneity merely under-mines intraneighborhood social cohesion: People in ethnically heterogeneous environments are less likely to trust their neighbors (sic) or to have contact with them. However, this does not spill over to generalized trust, to informal help and voluntary work, or to other forms of prosocial behavior (sic) and attitudes, at least not in Europe. (2014: 474)

(For another review of recent academic work on diversity and a longer discussion of Putnam’s *E Pluribus Unum* lecture, see Morales 2013.)

Studies on immigration and migration

Within the British and American contexts, immigration and migrants are dominant themes within studies of public attitudes towards diversity. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) reviewed studies of public attitudes towards immigration in North America and Western Europe. The authors identified weaknesses and discrepancies across a large body of research literature. The authors concluded that attitudes towards immigration show little evidence of being strongly correlated with personal economic circumstances. In particular, the authors argue that claims about labour market competition, and its effects on anti-immigration attitudes, are not supported across the reviewed studies. (The authors refer to the labour market competition hypothesis as a “zombie theory”.) The authors argue that having more education is consistently correlated with less restrictive immigration views. Our analysis echoes this sentiment.

Academics who have identified migration as a “touchstone” issue have asserted the need for new narratives on immigration, to counter the purported effects of migration discourse on fear and hate (Crawley and McMahon 2016). Crawley and McMahon identified a split in public attitudes: two minority groups (each representing a quarter of the population) who see either the benefits or the threat of migration and the rest who the authors describe as an “anxious middle”, a group that is:

...sceptical about their government’s handling of immigration and worried about the effects of immigration on society and the economy but are not overly hostile toward migrants themselves, especially those who are perceived as having skills and able to make a contribution to the economy. (2016: 5)

Ceobanu and Escondell (2010) reviewed public opinion and immigration studies that analysed data from nine multinational survey projects. The authors identified several methodological challenges and theoretical constraints across these studies. The authors identified terminological ambiguity, a fixation on competitive threat and a need to widen the scope of theory and analysis (2010: 310). Nevertheless, as the authors argue:

This body of research has consistently documented strong public reactions to immigrants and immigration in advanced economies, spanning from reluctant acceptance to outright rejection. (2010: 311)

Research on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration has been described as “a timely, yet daunting endeavour” (2010: 322). According to the authors, there are several non-attitudinal determinants of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration that are pertinent in Western Europe. According to their study, those with higher educational attainment are less likely to hold negative attitudes, as are those with higher employment and occupational status, and those with higher incomes. Attitudinal determinants include: concerns about the economic impact of immigrants; the number of immigrants in the local area or the country at large; political views (normally measured on a “left-right” spectrum); and attachments to the national community. In terms of specific contexts that are especially conducive to negative attitudes, the authors assert the visibility of a minority group in a local area. They reject the size of an immigrant group as a determinant on the grounds that available evidence suggests larger groups are more likely to foster some form of intergroup contact and trust. (Anecdotal evidence from various towns in northern England might refute such a finding). Similarly, an underperforming economy may trigger negative attitudes although not all the reviewed studies confirmed this. Regardless of the persuasiveness of the authors’ arguments, the present study rests on a shared assumption that analysis needs to consider the micro-, meso- and macro-levels (for example, the local, the regional and national).

Analysis of public attitudes towards immigration has revealed the role of attitudes towards population change as one of the main drivers of negative sentiment towards immigration (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).

Building on their own previous work Laurence and Bentley (2018) analysed data from the European Social Survey and posited:

...the existence of dual, mediating pathways of both positive and negative inter-group contact. Applying generalized structural equation models to data from the 2014 European Social Survey, we find that living in more diverse communities increases the frequency of positive inter-group contact but also negative inter-group contact...[W]hile the net-effect of diversity on attitudes via contact is positive, attitudes amongst those experiencing more frequent negative contact become progressively worse. Increasing diversity therefore leads to a polarisation in attitudes towards immigration as a result of, and not due to a lack of, inter-group contact. (Laurence and Bentley 2018: 83, see also Laurence 2014 and Laurence and Bentley 2016)

A recent study of attitudes towards immigration among the British public (IMIX/Ipsos MORI 2019) found positive attitudes towards the impact of migration on Britain: 47% positive, 29% negative, 18% indecisive and 6% who answered “don’t know”. The report found that anti-immigration sentiment appears to be decreasing among those who voted Leave in the 2016 EU Referendum: from 53% who were negative in October 2016 to 47% who were negative in August 2019. Despite this, the report found the British public to be split over whether immigration improves people’s standard of living: with 30% agreeing it does in August 2019, compared to 36% who disagreed. Further, and finally, a majority of Britons in August 2019 expressed the view that immigration numbers should be reduced: 54%, compared to 9% who felt it should be increased.

Recent studies have been situated within a post-Brexit context with some examining the British public’s attitudes towards the scale and economic impacts of immigration (Rolfe et al 2018). Other recent evidence from the Migration Observatory (Blinder and Richards 2020), an Oxford-based research unit, revealed that, whilst immigration was often named as Britain’s most important issue between 2006 and 2016, it has since fallen behind the EU and the NHS as one of the nation’s primary concerns. The report discussed attitudes towards changing rates of immigration. These are described in a later chapter. Evidence from recent research clearly shows that levels of opposition to immigration in the UK are moderately high. Those who favoured reducing the number of immigrants coming to Britain in 2019 was 44% (22% say “reduce a lot” and a further 22% say “reduce a little”). A further 39% said they would prefer the number of immigrants to stay about the same (the most common answer), while those favouring an increase were a minority of 17%. The same question

asked in a face-to-face survey in 2013 found that 77% favour a reduction in numbers suggesting that attitudes may have shifted somewhat.

Previous studies of the *British Social Attitudes Survey* have suggested that public attitudes towards immigration have become more negative since 1990 and that attitudes during that time were more positive in London and Scotland (Crawley, Drinkwater and Kauser 2013).

Academic studies opting for a critical approach to immigration and citizenship law (i.e. one that asserts the role of the state in creating structural inequalities for minority groups), have described hierarchies among migrants. These hierarchies “mirror” attributes of non-meritocratic social group membership such as sex/gender, race/ethnicity, nationality, religion and class. Whilst the present study does not focus primarily on experiences of migration, it does include consideration of how demographic and socio-economic factors shape attitudes towards migrants, including those that inform such hierarchies (Ellermann 2020).

Data collected by the European Social Survey in 2003 (EUMC 2005) revealed that 25% of people living in “the old EU” (pre 1 May 2004) favoured resisting multicultural society and that 60% favoured limiting it, and that 39% opposed civil rights for legal migrants. Compared to other member states at the time, the UK were placed seventh in a list of most resistant to immigrants, below countries such as Greece, Hungary and Austria and above, for example, Denmark, Spain and West Germany. A similar survey conducted in 2019 showed that public concerns about migration were not as prominent in the UK as in other European countries. Whilst immigration was considered the most important issue in nearly every other Member State, for respondents in the UK, it came behind the economic situation (EC 2019).

Other studies of hierarchies have found evidence for “a consistent hierarchy of preferences between immigrant groups, with White and culturally more proximate immigrant groups less opposed than non-White and culturally more distinct immigrants” (Ford 2011: 1017).

Previous survey work on immigration includes questions in the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey (Migration Watch 2014) which asked respondents what caused the most division both in their local area and nationally. 41% of respondents (the highest number) cited tension between immigrants and people born in Britain as the biggest problem in their local vicinity. 57% said tension between immigrants and people born in Britain caused the most division nationally.

Studies of ethnicity

As we might expect, race and ethnicity are two dominant themes in the study of diversity. And again, as we might expect, many studies of ethnic diversity intersect with issues around immigration and migrants (see, among others, Morales 2013; Laurence 2014; Lymeropoulou 2020).

Early empirical and theoretical work from the US attempted to create a framework within which future studies of prejudice, tolerance and attitudes towards ethnic groups might be situated. Some going as far to suggest we move away from the concept of prejudice altogether:

[...] in favor (sic) of empirical treatment of an inter-ethnic attitude as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be summarized or described by a single term or measure. (Jackman 1977: 145)

The study of ethnicity and diversity has been described as a “fast evolving field” (Platt and Nandi 2020: 840). The challenges faced by academics when researching minority groups have been described as including, but not limited to, measuring ethnicity and ethnic identity (Burton, Nandi and Platt 2008). Burton, Nandi and Platt conducted a review of previous academic literature and studied aspects of *Understanding Society: The UK Household Longitudinal Study*. In the authors’ own words:

...no UK survey dedicated to the study of issues concerned with ethnicity and ethnic diversity since the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities was carried out in England and Wales in 1994. (2008: 1)

The authors describe the potential (since realised) of *Understanding Society* to become an unprecedented resource for the study of ethnic identity and ethnic groups. However, the authors warned that no single question which would provide an optimum measure of “ethnic group” or which would meet the diverse needs and demands of researchers and policy makers. The present study is conducted with the acceptance that survey questions cannot reveal complex truths about ethnic identity but that complex pictures of self-described ethnic identity can be built up using various other demographic and socio-economic variables. These are used to avoid essentialising ethnic groups or unwittingly perpetuating damaging stereotypes.

Studies have sought to address debates concerning whether living in diverse areas has negative consequences for attitudes towards other groups (outgroup attitudes) and community relations. Hewstone and Schmid (2014) found:

that individuals living in more ethnically diverse areas – regardless of whether they are White British members of the majority or non-Muslim members of ethnic minorities – have more positive contact with Muslims, with positive consequences for intergroup relations with Muslims. (Hewstone and Schmid 2014: 320; see also Schmid, Ramiah and Hewstone 2014)

Among the conclusions from a recent study of public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants were three of relevance to the present study (Holloway et al 2019). First, that most Britons consistently overestimate the number of migrants in the UK: “In 2018, refugees and other migrants accounted for 14% of the current UK population, yet the majority of

Britons assume that 27% of the UK population are migrants” (2019: 1). Second, that the UK is among the EU countries with the most positive attitudes towards immigration, but Britons hold the most negative attitudes towards refugee assistance. According to the authors’ briefing paper, while most Britons favour a reduction in immigration, it has ranked as a less important issue for the public since the EU Referendum. Third, and as other studies have found, public narratives on refugees and other migrants are polarised between a “threat narrative” and a “positive narrative”.

Whilst our report does not advocate abandoning common terms, it recognises both the complexity of attitudes towards other ethnic, national and religious groups and the challenges in analysing them. Our analysis considers multiple demographic and socio-economic factors to mitigate the risks of essentialising or stereotyping minority groups and the attitudes towards them.

Recent work has developed an area classification to examine immigration, ethnic diversity and its social consequences in local authorities in England and Wales (Lymperopoulou 2020). Lymperopoulou proposed an area classification framework to aid understanding of the national and local impacts of international migration in England and Wales. Whilst the present survey study does not use area classification approaches, we have taken care to create variables to inform both classification and policy work focused on understanding local and regional variation in attitudes towards migration, alongside ethnic and religious diversity. Other work has sought to highlight the local and regional ethnic differences in relation to education, employment, health and housing across England and Wales using Census data (Finney and Lymperopoulou 2014).

Previous studies have considered the role of perceived ethnic diversity (Piekut and Valentine 2016) and found an increase in perceived ethnic diversity in a neighbourhood is related to an increase in ethnic prejudice in White British people. The present study includes measures of perceived ethnic, national and religious diversity (alongside measures of actual diversity derived from Census data).

Leading British academics have argued for the role of nationally representative data:

...detailed single country studies, based on high quality nationally representative data have much to offer in enhancing our understanding of diversity within and between groups. (Platt and Nandi 2020: 839)

Earlier research work on public attitudes towards ethnic minority communities conducted by the UK Government’s Cabinet Office found a public largely intolerant of migrants and ethnic minorities. Cabinet Office researchers found that the number of migrants and people from ethnic minorities in the UK was often over-estimated by the British public by factors of three or four (Saggar and Drean 2001; see also Duffy 2018). Factors that were seen at the time to drive negative attitudes (presumably derived from similar methods as those employed in the present study) were: being

older, being poorer, being less well educated, living in the North (2001: 3). The present study seeks to update and develop this work by analysing more recent large-scale data and considering multiple demographic and socio-economic variables.

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CHANGE

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

In this report, we have chosen to separate our analysis of attitudes towards diversity (i.e. whether it is good for British society and our local neighbourhoods) from more specific attitudes towards *increasing* diversity (i.e. whether it is increasing too much in Britain and our local neighbourhoods). There are, of course, many overlaps. In fact, any attempt to gather data relating to attitudes towards diversity in the UK, or Western Europe, or any developed country, does so within the context of increasing diversity, whether driven by migration from abroad, urban growth or birth rates. Two of the most frequently used theories in the field of diversity studies – *contact theory* and *threat theory* – both imply significant demographic change resulting in increased opportunities for intergroup mixing or heightened concerns around competition for jobs and housing.

Despite these obvious thematic overlaps, research rarely focuses specifically on how the British public feels toward the changing nature of their local neighbourhoods. Researchers rarely focus on whether ethnic, national and religious diversity is increasing too quickly for some, and whether attitudes differ when people are asked to consider national or local change. Our research design aimed to address some of these gaps.

Using 2011 Census data, the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity (2012) drew the following conclusions concerning changes in the ethnic diversity of England and Wales since 1991. In their own words:

- In 2011, one-in-five people (20%) identified with an ethnic group other than White British compared with 13% in 2001.
- The population with an ethnic background other than White (White British, White Irish and White Other) has doubled in size since 1991 from 3 to 7 million, while remaining a minority of the total population (14%).
- The African ethnic group has grown faster than any other minority group in the last two decades, doubling in each decade to reach 990,000 in 2011.
- There has been continued ethnic group mixing within families and neighbourhoods. The number of people identifying with a “Mixed” ethnic category has increased by almost a half since 2001 to more than a million.

- The “Other” ethnic group categories – “White Other”, “Other Black”, “Other Asian”, “Other Mixed” and “Other” have all increased, in total by over 2 million in the last 10 years. The existing ethnic group categories are, perhaps, becoming increasingly less meaningful for many people.
- The residential areas with the greatest growth of ethnic minority groups are those areas where they were fewest in 2001, particularly in parts of East Anglia. (CoDE 2012)

Projections of the ethnic minority population of the United Kingdom have used census data combined with estimates for fertility, mortality and migration rates (Coleman 2010). Based on the continuation of current patterns of immigration, the proportion of the population described as White British, Irish and Scottish, which comprised 90% of the UK’s total population in 2006, is expected to fall to 56% by 2056. Non-White minority populations are estimated to rise from around 10% in 2006 to 34% by 2056 (2010: 461-2). In Coleman’s own words:

If overall net immigration continues as projected by the ONS, and if the ethnic distributions assumed here are even approximately correct, then the ethnic composition of the United Kingdom would be radically transformed within the current century. By mid-century the non-White population would increase to 24 million (31 percent) and the Other White minority to 7 million (10 percent). Continued further, the White British population would have fallen below half by the late 2060s. Variant projections with lower, arguably more plausible migration levels moderate that conclusion. Even if all immigration ceased, the minority groups would double to comprise one-fifth of the population before age-structure momentum became exhausted. Beyond that, only the Mixed populations would continue to increase unless some segregated groups preserved their high fertility. (2010: 476)

The religious landscape has also changed. According to a report from the Commission of Religion and Belief in British Public Life (CORAB 2015) almost half of the population of England describes itself as non-religious, as compared with an eighth in 2001. There has been a general decline in Christian affiliation. In 1985, two-thirds of the population identified as Christian but by 2015 that figure was four in ten. Finally, there have also been increases in religious diversity. Fifty years ago, Judaism – at one in fifty – was the largest non-Christian tradition. Today, it is the fourth largest behind Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism. Taken as a group, religious minorities make up one in ten of the UK population.

Despite the overwhelming evidence of increased diversity past and future, studies of attitudes towards it and its consequences are more often focused on general attitudes towards migration and multiculturalism rather than on attitudes towards national and local demographic change. To be clear, a strong interest in demographic change is often implied through studies of diversity: studies asserting the benefits of intergroup contact, or anxieties around the threat to local

jobs and housing do so against a vivid backdrop of demographic change, particularly since 2000 (see Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). Yet there have been fewer attempts to assess attitudes related directly to that change. A review of the research literature, a vast and expanding body of work, revealed that specific questions around attitudes to the changing nature of Britain and local communities remain under-researched.

For example, and perhaps for entirely justifiable reasons, the emphasis in most academic studies is on ethnic and religious minority rights rather than on the attitudes of the native population, where “native” denotes being born in the UK, rather than being White British) (see Runnymede Trust 2019). Such analysis adopts a highly critical approach to negative attitudes towards immigration as demonstrated in depictions of “hostile national narratives on limiting immigration and rejecting multiculturalism” (2019: 1).

Where native populations are considered in towns and cities undergoing significant demographic change, emphasis is placed on the so-called “White working class” who are often depicted as protagonists for bigotry, racism and far-right extremism (see Pai 2016).

Issues concerning diversity are most often seen through the lens of ethnic and religious minority groups and migrants to the UK. These groups are often described as being in tension with “White British” communities and targeted by negative attitudes underpinned by “White working class” culture, where “White” is a proxy for bigotry and racism. “White British” communities are often depicted as hotbeds of far-right extremism, with individuals cast as either vulnerable to far-right messaging or responsible for its dissemination.

Fewer studies are conducted from the perspective of native-born populations of mixed ethnic and religious heritage. As the Runnymede Trust pointed out, to describe a “White working class” in northern England is to ignore the socio-economic deprivation faced by many minority groups also living in these places (Runnymede Trust 2019).

We are also concerned about the over-simplification of the “White working class”. Simplistic descriptions of negative public attitudes towards diversity as being the sole reserve of far-right extremism ignores the complex and nuanced views held by many, regardless of identity, status or wider political opinion. Where this occurs, attitudes are often misunderstood and misreported.

British Future (Katwala, Ballinger and Rhodes 2014) has encouraged a more balanced approach to reporting British attitudes towards immigration among the public at large. As Sunder Katwala, chair of British Future, has argued:

Most people aren’t desperate to pull up the drawbridge and stop all immigration, nor are they crying out for more of it. Instead they’re somewhere in the middle: worried about the impacts on jobs, public services and on the ‘Britishness’ of our culture; but aware of the

benefits to our economy. A clear majority opposes prejudice against migrants who come here to better themselves. (2014: 6)

And:

Most of the public is perfectly capable of holding a variety of nuanced positions on immigration. They worry about the pace of change and the impact of large numbers of new arrivals on housing, the availability of jobs and the cultural 'feel' of their local area. Yet at the same time they also recognise the economic benefits for employers of being able to hire the skilled workers that they want; for our universities being able to attract the brightest and best students to study (and pay fees) here; and they also feel pride in Britain's long tradition of protecting refugees. (2014: 10)

British Future's willingness to engage, and trust, the British public is demonstrated in a later report on the uncertainties around Britain's future relationship with EU, and immigration policy, following the 2017 General Election:

Given the divisions uncovered by the referendum debate, consulting the public may sound like a thankless task – or even a hopeless one. But such defeatism underestimates the capacity for consensus among the public. (2014: 5)

Whilst also questioning this categorisation of "White working class", Thomas et al (2018) reported data on attitudes towards diversity from low income, mainly White areas within Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, a town portrayed by the media as one of the "failed spaces" of multiculturalism. Their research echoed pessimistic findings from other studies but also revealed among White interviewees an appetite for greater and more productive contact with other ethnic groups. Their research revealed that negative attitudes towards diversity have largely failed to coalesce into support for the anti-minority politics of the English Defence League: negative, but far from extremist.

In 2017, research conducted by British Future revealed support among the British public for a future immigration system that favoured skilled migration over low-skilled migration (Katwala, Ballinger and Rhodes 2017). Their findings suggest a public appetite for supporting businesses wishing to recruit from overseas, even low-skilled workers, alongside tighter immigration controls exercised by the UK Government.

Previous research by the UK Government has revealed the complex interplay of diversity and economic factors. In 2013, the Government Office for Science concluded:

The research evidence demonstrates that ethnic diversity on its own does not result in a lack of social cohesion but that ethnic diversity, population mobility and economic deprivation combine together to have a negative effect. Thus, the impact of increased ethnic

diversity upon social and neighbourhood cohesion will be strongly influenced by economic conditions and the relative prosperity of individual ethnic groups (2013: 3).

The Government Office for Science focused on citizenship as an example of the divergence underpinning decreased cohesion. According to their report, there is the tendency for White Britons to identify with individual countries within the UK (i.e. to feel more English than British), and for ethnic minority groups to be more likely to identify themselves as British (see also Home Office 2013).

Previous academic research has asked: Is White tolerance in diverse neighbourhoods the result of a positive effect of inter-ethnic contact [contact between ethnic groups], or does it arise from “White flight”, with anti-immigrant Whites exiting diverse areas but remaining within wider geographies as radicalised opponents of immigration? (Kaufmann and Harris 2015: 1563). Their analysis focused on support for the British National Party (a once-popular far-right party whose aspirations to join the British political mainstream were dampened after a series of poor election performance and media appearances by its senior leadership). Kaufmann and Harris concluded that the apparent relationship between diversity and support for the BNP was often determined by the unit of measurement. Typically, diversity and support were positively correlated at the local authority level but not correlated or negatively correlated at the ward level. In other words, the relationship appeared to change depending on which geographical unit was chosen. To address the challenges suggested by this finding, our study relied on a variety of geographic units; from subjective measurements of respondents’ local communities, through local authorities and regions (North East, North West, East Midlands, etc.) to the whole of England and Wales.

Kaufmann and Harris considered a concept related to “threat theory” and an example of a reaction to demographic change within local neighbourhoods: the departure from diverse areas of less tolerant White residents (so-called “White flight”). As part of their research, Kaufmann and Harris tested the hypothesis that White British residents who are more hostile to immigration will be more likely to leave diverse wards than White British people who are less opposed to immigration. They found that “White British are no more likely to leave diverse wards than other ethnic groups” (2015: 1577). Nor did they find a relationship between anti-immigration sentiment (Conservative voting and English identity) and moving to “White” areas. Undermining some notions of “White flight”, the research revealed that whilst “Whites” (the authors term) move to “Whiter” areas than “non-Whites”, those with anti-immigration and pro-immigration move to areas with similar levels of diversity (2015: 1578).

Having studied “White working class communities” in Birmingham, Coventry and London, Beider (2011) recommended that the UK Government and its policy-makers need to “reconfigure community cohesion” to create a local climate more conducive to shared values and reduced

intolerance, with increased opportunities for local debate and discussion. Beider proposed policies that draw from the principles of conflict resolution where needed. According to Beider, the UK Government has not been effective in championing diversity and change and needs to make the case for diversity more often. Research participants stressed the importance of informal and routine interactions:

In shops, schools and on the street, conversations begin to help break down barriers and build cohesion. Informal community engagement presents challenges in terms of measurement, but residents suggested this is where most of the work in community building happens in practice. (2011: 4)

Beider's conclusions stressed the need for empathy and understanding for majority, as well as minority groups:

Many residents felt they were a forgotten community ("the forgot-about people") and had been ignored by policymakers at local or national level (sic). The sense of disconnection was due to neighbourhood change but also the impact of immigration. (2011:1)

Other similar research has suggested changes in the nature of diversity have reconfigured patterns of prejudice. For example, Pearce and Milne (2010) argue that on their Bradford estates, the traditional "Asian other" was being displaced for some by the asylum seeker and migrant worker from Eastern Europe: newcomers resented by both Asian and White working-class communities. Our pilot work in East London revealed similar attitudes and patterns that are both national and local (see also Garner 2011). Few UK studies have replicated the type of research showing emotional reactions to anticipated ethnic demographic change within White Canadians (see Outten et al 2012).

Research has shown that anti-immigration attitudes are related to the pace of demographic change rather diversity itself (Kaufmann 2014). White British people in areas experiencing rapid ethnic change are more likely to call for lower immigration and to vote BNP. In areas where there is already a high level of ethnic minorities, White opinion is less hostile to immigration.

Lord Ashcroft's classification from his report *Small island: Public opinion and the politics of immigration* (Ashcroft 2013) demonstrates the way research frames anti-immigrant sentiment. Ashcroft's scale from positive to negative includes these categories: "militantly multicultural", "urban harmony", "comfortable pragmatists", "fighting for entitlements", "competing for jobs", "cultural concerns" and "universal hostility". Our study aims at a neutral stance on anti-immigration attitudes, seeking to understand rather than condemn.

Our research design also rests on the assumption that anti-immigration attitudes are not the sole preserve of White British people. Counter-intuitive reactions to change have been identified by

previous studies using cluster analysis to classify local authorities within England and Wales into 12 discrete groups on the basis of key migration and socio-economic indicators, reflecting the different volumes and types of migrants they have received. Conclusions included:

The White British population in areas with the most change in the foreign born population between 2004 and 2011 is least likely to say that the amount of immigration should be reduced (although this is still the majority in these areas). (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 21)

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MARRIAGE

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

We conducted a review of previous academic research on relations between ethnic, national and religious groups (often referred by academics as the study of intergroup relations).

Academic research

Academic research on intergroup marriage, and the use of marriage data to better understand intergroup relations, have long histories. In 1939, renowned American sociologist James H.S. Bossard wrote:

The statistics of intermarriage constitute perhaps the most concrete measurable data on the relations of population elements to each other. The more a group marries within itself, the more intense its cultural or racial consciousness, and/or the higher the feeling of antipathy or prejudice against it; on the other hand, the higher the rate of intermarriage, other factors remaining equal, the greater the degree of social acceptance between the two population elements involved. Whatever other factors are involved in marriage selection or in social distance, our basic contention is that the facts of intermarriage can tell us much about the attitudes of population elements towards each other. (1939: 792)

Another pivotal study from that era, Emory S. Bogardus' *Social Distance Theory* (1933; see also Bogardus 1925), provided a still-popular theoretical framework for studies of intergroup relations and prejudice. Bogardus re-imagined social relationships between groups as a series of encounters measured along a scale of social distance. From the "furthest" relations with people from different backgrounds, such as those within political or national groups (e.g. two people from different ethnic backgrounds who live in the same country), through "closer" relationships, such as within neighbourhoods, schools and churches (e.g. two people from different ethnic backgrounds who attend the same place of worship). Bogardus' scale ends with the very "closest" relationships one may have with someone from a different background; a relationship with someone who is in your own family or household unit.

Bogardus' Social Distance Scale

- As close relatives by marriage (i.e., as the legal spouse of a close relative) (score 1.00)
- As my close personal friends (2.00)
- As neighbors (sic) on the same street (3.00)
- As co-workers in the same occupation (4.00)
- As citizens in my country (5.00)
- As non-citizen visitors in my country (6.00)
- Would exclude from entry into my country (7.00)

(Bogardus 1933)

Almost forty years later, Cavan applied the concept of social distance to interreligious marriage (1971). She asserted that “people belonging to religious organizations of the same or similar social status will intermarry more frequently than persons belonging to religious organizations of dissimilar social status” and that “persons belonging to organized religions that are similar in belief and practices will intermarry more frequently than those who belong to religions with dissimilar beliefs and practices” (1971:99). The present study draws on Cavan’s notion of status by examining the possibility of discernible hierarchies of identities.

During the last two decades scholars have continued to develop our understanding of the role of intergroup marriage within wider patterns of social relations. Green, Abelson and Garnett (1999) distinguished hate crime offenders from other citizens based, in part, on attitudes towards interracial marriage. It has been argued that inter-ethnic marriage is “a barometer of racial/ethnic relations and intergroup social distance” (Qian and Lichter 2007: 1). Other studies of outgroup prejudice and intergroup reconciliation have used attitudes towards marriage as a metric, although have only suggested, rather than confirmed, a relationship between expressed positive attitudes towards intergroup marriage and reduced levels of prejudice (Paluck 2009).

Muttarak and Heath (2010) found that Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani people are less likely to marry outside their own group. One key limitation here is the inability to ascertain whether the lack of outgroup marriage is driven by “White resistance” to marrying into South Asian minority groups or whether patterns are related, with each group perhaps reciprocating established attitudes and reproducing increasingly rigid social norms. The present study uses survey data and interviews to explore these types of “reciprocated” attitudes.

Citing Muttarak and Heath, Storm, Sobolewska and Ford (2017) argued that inter-ethnic marriage demonstrates a disjuncture between “short time horizon” concerns around migration and diversity and the “long run” improvement in relations between majority and ethnically distinct groups seen across several European societies. Their study tested a hypothesis that: “all minority groups will prefer intra-marriage, followed by in-laws from the White majority and with the Muslim in-laws as least desirable” (2017: 415). They found a hierarchy with the majority White group ranked at the top (presumably below intra-marriage) and Muslims consistently ranked at the bottom. Age was also seen to be a determining factor shaping negative attitudes towards all other ethnic groups among older White respondents. Younger respondents were more open to all other groups except Muslims. In fact, Muslims were shown to be “a minority attracting uniquely intense hostility from all other groups” (2017: 431).

Various previous surveys have included questions on intergroup marriage; our work builds on these previous attempts. In 1994, the *Young People's Social Attitudes Survey* (Social and Community Planning Research, Barnardo's, Policy and Development Unit 1994): “Would you mind or not mind if a close relative married a person of Black or West Indian origin?” (3-part Likert scale: Mind a lot, Mind a little, Not mind). A large majority of White respondents (75%) answered “not mind”. A similar proportion (75%) answered “not mind” when asked about a person of Asian origin. Although similar questions were asked to Asian and Black respondents, low sample sizes (less than 10 in some cases) made comparisons between ethnic groups difficult.

The *British Social Attitudes Survey* asked questions related to tolerance of religious difference and marriage in 2008 and 2018. In 2008, 74% answered that they would probably accept or definitely accept a person from a different religion marrying a relative and 18% that they would probably not or definitely not accept. In 2018, those accepting rose to 82% and those not accepting fell to 10%.

In 2013, the *British Social Attitudes Survey* (NatCen 2013) asked: Would you mind if one of your close relatives were to marry a person of Eastern European origin? (3-part Likert scale: Mind a lot, Mind a little, Not mind). Categories had been Asian or Caribbean (West Indian) and were expanded that year to include Muslims, East Europeans and Black Africans. In 2015, the *Scottish Social Attitudes Survey* (ScotCen 2015) asked: (And how would you feel if a close relative of yours married or formed a long-term relationship with) a Christian? (5-part Likert scale: Very happy to Very Unhappy). In 2013, respondents were asked about a scenario in which a close relative married a Muslim. 44% said they object (mind a little or mind a lot) and 52% that they would not mind. A previous question asked by the survey in 2003, 25% said they would object, suggesting an increase in negative sentiment towards Muslims from 2003 onwards (BRIN, 2013).

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FRIENDSHIP

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

Part I: Previous academic research

Studies of human intergroup contact, alongside that of diverse friendships, are recurrent themes within contemporary social psychology. Most lines of scholarly enquiry within this and other related fields lead from G. W. Allport's foundational work *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954/1979).

Allport provided a well-established and oft-cited theoretical framework for understanding the role of contact to better understand and improve intergroup relations and, therefore, wider society.

Social psychological studies of intergroup contact following Allport now constitute a vast body of scholarly literature. (For comprehensive overviews see Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Davies et al 2011; Hodson 2011; and Dovidio et al 2017.) The research summarised here explores experiences or encounters with others, particularly those leading to friendships.

Allport (1954/1979) held that four conditions must be met to ensure that the positive effects of intergroup contact can occur: equal group status within the situation; the presence of common goals; some form of intergroup cooperation; and the presence of support, whether by an authority, law or custom (Pettigrew 1998).

Contact can produce various outcomes, from initial, perhaps superficial, acquaintance to long-term, deep-rooted relationships. Within this context, friendship has emerged as an important component of intergroup contact theory; its apparent potency as an analytical frame derived from the presence of all four of Allport's mediating processes (Pettigrew 1998): more than mere contact; more than mere encounter. As Pettigrew argued, "[o]ptimal intergroup contact requires time for cross-group friendships to develop" and that, once we adopt a long-term perspective on contact, we can expect "striking results" (1998: 76). In short, friendship works.

As discussed in the literature review in the Diversity chapter, Putnam (2007) described two consequences of increased diversity, both of which have implications for forming intergroup friendships:

- first, withdrawal from community leading to self-segregation, known in some situations as "White flight" (the so-called "exit" route); and

- secondly, negative attitudes towards immigration and political support for anti-immigration parties (the so-called “voice” route).

Despite these negative perspectives, academic research has sought to reveal more positive relations between contact, friendship and reduced prejudices.

Meta-analytical approaches (simultaneous analyses of multiple studies) have been used to gather together knowledge developed across decades of research (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Davies et al 2011; and Dovidio et al 2017). Intergroup friendships and, more specifically, inter-ethnic friendship have been shown to reduce prejudice, and by a greater extent than contact alone (Pettigrew 1997, 1998).

Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) analysed over 500 studies and confirmed that intergroup contact (conceptualised as racial and ethnic encounters), typically reduces prejudice and that effect sizes in respect of these reductions are generally similar across these studies. In other words, broadly similar strengths of association between greater intergroup contact and reduced intergroup prejudice are observable across multiple studies. Positive contact and friendships with the outgroup members lead to increases in empathy, reduction of anxiety and ultimately to reduction of negative intergroup attitudes. The effects are observable beyond participants in the immediate contact situation:

Not only do attitudes toward the immediate participants usually become more favorable (sic), but so do attitudes toward the entire outgroup, outgroup members in other situations, and even outgroups not involved in the contact. (2006: 766)

Further, the authors found evidence to suggest the efficacy of intergroup contact beyond racial and ethnic groups. Accordingly, the present study widens the focus to include consideration of ethnicity, nationality and religion, and subgroups defined by region, age, education, employment, income, recent voting behaviour and, where applicable, religiosity.

Davies et al (2011) offered further confirmation that “cross-group” friendships are associated with more positive intergroup attitudes but also insights into the nature and quality of friendship. Among several factors analysed as part of the meta-analysis, including the number of outgroup friends and the proportion of friends who are outgroup members, analysis revealed that two behavioural indicators – time spent and self-disclosure (revealing personal things about yourself) – had the strongest association with reduced prejudice. In terms of ethnicity, nationality and religion, “target outgroups based on racial or ethnic background tend to yield weaker effects as compared to outgroups based on other categories such as religious background” (2011: 333). In other words, when the relationship between cross-group friendship and intergroup attitudes is investigated, and

modes of friendship considered, friendships across religious lines appear to promote more positive intergroup attitudes than those across racial or ethnic lines.

Dovidio et al (2017) reflected on studies addressing the reduction of intergroup bias through intergroup contact as published in specialist academic journal, *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*. Their review found studies identifying “the mechanisms that mediate and factors that moderate the effects of intergroup contact” (2017: 616). These include various indirect forms of contact: extended contact (Wright et al 1997); vicarious contact (Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes 2005); and imagined contact (Crisp and Turner 2009). Meta-analysis identifies multiple studies concluding that contact quality is more influential in changing intergroup attitudes than contact quantity. (For a more detailed discussion, see Dovidio et al 2017: 608-611.)

Numerous previous studies of intergroup theory have focused specifically on ethnically diverse friendships and their effect on reducing outgroup prejudices. (See the aforementioned meta-analyses and also, inter alia, Powers and Ellison 1995; Pettigrew 1997; Aberson, Shoemaker and Tomolillo 2004; Hodson 2011; and Munniksma et al 2013.)

Lower levels of prejudices and higher numbers of intergroup friendships might appear to some to be a type of “chicken and egg” question. Which comes first? Does having non-diverse friends make us more prejudiced, or does being more prejudiced decrease the likelihood of having diverse friends? Using outgroups represented by ethnic minority communities in European countries, previous research has sought to address these questions of causality (i.e. does one lead to another) and causal direction (i.e. which comes first). Research has confirmed what many people will feel intuitively:

- that people lacking intergroup contact are more likely to have outgroup prejudices (i.e. fewer friends leading to more prejudice);
- but that prejudiced people tend to avoid intergroup contact (i.e. more prejudice leading to fewer friends).

Thus, the causal link between contact and prejudice can be described as a two-way process (Pettigrew 1998). That said, according to Pettigrew, studies that have tested both “causal paths” have found that the positive effects of cross-group friendship are larger than those of the bias. Findings suggest the “intergroup-friends-to-less-prejudice” causal path is greater than the “prejudice-to-fewer-outgroup-friends” causal path.

In sum, research has suggested that having diverse friends impacts more forcefully on our prejudices than our prejudice does on our choice of friends.

In order to address the increasing social unacceptability of blatant forms of racism – overt and explicit racism – research has focused on more implicit biases (deep-rooted prejudices within

the subconscious mind that are unlikely or unable to be expressed overtly). Analysis of data pertaining to African American, Latino and White Americans revealed that people with close friends from the target groups exhibited less implicit prejudice than participants without close friends from the same groups (Aberson, Shoemaker and Tomolillo 2004).

Given the paradox of intergroup contact being both most required and least likely among highly prejudiced persons, previous research addressed whether contact works on those most in need of intervention (Hodson 2011). Findings revealed that contact works well, if not best, among those “higher on prejudice-prone individual-difference variables” (2011: 155). In other words, those with characteristics associated with prejudice took at least some benefit from intergroup contact.

Research has revealed inter-ethnic friendships can lead to better integration and more positive outgroup attitudes within educational settings (Munniksma 2013). Intergroup friendships have been found to be among factors that reduce anti-immigrant attitudes (Miklikowska 2017). Quantitative research into generational, ethnic and religious diversity within the contemporary British context has revealed having “co-ethnic close friends” to be the most common friendship group (Muttarak 2014). Whilst the “ethnic boundary” weakens across generations, friendships are often formed in a “pan-ethnic” pattern. Ethnicity and religion are key factors bringing together, for example, Muslim people with Indian and Pakistani backgrounds, or Mixed ethnicity and Black people with Caribbean backgrounds.

The goals and needs of intergroup interactions depend on majority or minority status. Research suggests that majority groups tend to seek popularity and moral affirmation whereas minority groups tend to seek empowerment and respect (Bergsieker, Shelton and Richeson, 2010). For individuals from stigmatised groups, positive intergroup contact can weaken perceptions that members of an outgroup hold negative views of the ingroup (Tredoux and Finchilescu 2010).

In terms of previous use of survey questions concerning intergroup friendships, YouGov reported in 2018 that one in three Britons (35%) have no friends from an ethnic minority background (although, of course, this means two thirds do, a possible good news story). Citizenship Survey data collected between 2007 and 2009 also revealed that a majority of Britons have inter-ethnic friends (Muttarak 2014). Topics related to friendships across national and religious lines have been less well-served by recent British surveys.

To sum up, regardless of which friendships follow reduced prejudices or vice versa, and regardless of the setting or the people involved, research has shown repeatedly that, when it comes to tackling prejudice, friendship both matters and works.

Part 2: Recent UK Government policy

Despite a broad consensus among social psychologists – that intergroup friendship is likely to reduce intergroup prejudices – the role of friendship within the UK Government's policy strategies is curiously low-key. Whilst not absent entirely from the policy literature, intergroup contact theory is construed and applied rather vaguely. Further, the role of friendship not given the prominence it perhaps deserves given the strong evidence for the “intergroup-*friends-to-less-prejudice*” causal pathway described above.

The Casey Review (2016) addressed opportunity and integration in the UK in a pivotal and much-discussed report. In terms of intergroup friendship, the report states:

Where high concentrations of any ethnic or faith group are also segregated, with a lack of mixing, there are higher levels of prejudice, greater perceived threat and fewer inter-ethnic friendships. (2016: 53)

Inter-ethnic friendships are conceived as possible outcomes of mixing: here described negatively as a “lack of mixing” resulting in “fewer inter-ethnic friendships”. Instead, we argue, based on the social psychological literature, that inter-ethnic, or any intergroup, friendships might be more appropriately considered as a building block for better social integration. In other words, this is a factor determining better integration rather than a consequence of it.

Our survey examines current intergroup attitudes, patterns of intergroup friendship (described as “friendship diversity”) and the factors that determine the likelihood of having friends only from the same ethnic, national and religious background. These factors are presented as the prerequisites of friendship, the factors most likely to predict having the opportunity or inclination to have friends from diverse backgrounds.

Regarding intergroup contact more generally, the report states that “social interactions between people from different backgrounds play a significant part in enabling integration and social mobility” although does not offer detail as to how integration and mobility are enabled (2016: 53). The report laments the lack of social interaction across ethnicity, age and social grade.

Regarding age, the report places emphasis on initiatives for school children and young people (Youth Social Action Fund, The Prince's Trust, National Citizen Service, The Duke of Edinburgh Awards scheme). The report places “a premium on social mixing among young people in schools and in wider youth social action initiatives” (Casey 2016: 53). It states that initiatives, such as the National Citizen Service, are having a positive impact on relationships between young people from different backgrounds”. We widen the focus to study experiences of friendship among adults living in England and Wales.

Influenced by *The Casey Review* and reformulating many of its key recommendations concerning integration, the Ministry Housing Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) published its *Integrated Communities Strategy* in 2018 (MHCLG: 2018). As in the Casey Review, the terms “friend” and “friendship” are used sparingly. Individuals are encouraged to “grasp opportunities to forge relationships with people from different backgrounds as friends, neighbours, and colleagues” (2018: 16). School measures aimed at newly established free schools “encourage all students to reach out beyond their immediate friendship groups and work effectively with any other students” (2018: 29). A vision statement on boosting English language skills includes the aim of enabling everyone “to make friends with people from different backgrounds” (2018: 35). Again, friendship operates as the outcome of integration, not one of its determining factors. Results from a randomised control showing the positive effects of community-based English language skills reinforce the role of friendship as an outcome (2018: 40).

A short case study on the theme of parks and green spaces celebrates a project in Leeds that “gives local people the opportunity to make new friends with other people living in their local community”, hinting at the promotion of more diverse, intergroup friendships (2018: 47). Similarly, a sports project in London offers opportunities to “forge new friendships” (2018: 49). The Christian Muslim Forum states that a “fresh way of incubating friendship is catching the imagination of Christian and Muslim leaders” (2018: 60). The MHCLG’s aims relate to measuring success of, for example, social networks (including friends) using sources including the “adaption of existing data sources” (2018: 64).

Arguably, a more comprehensive and action-oriented approach to encouraging diverse friendship is found in the Mayor of London’s social integration strategy report *All of Us* published by the Greater London Authority (GLA 2018). The report argues that relationships in London could be more diverse.

- “Londoners must have opportunities to come together in public and political life, as well as through friendship” (2018: 17).
- “A truly socially integrated society is not just about interactions. It is about people building meaningful relationships, whether as friends, colleagues or fellow citizens” (2018: 17).
- “Although Londoners value diversity, this does not necessarily translate into friendships between individuals from different backgrounds. In 2015, some 21 per cent of Londoners reported that all their friends were of the same ethnicity as themselves” (2018: 21).

- “Although Londoners value diversity, this does not necessarily translate into friendships between individuals from different backgrounds. In 2015, some 21 per cent of Londoners reported that all their friends were of the same ethnicity as themselves” (2018: 27).
- “[I]t is not the Mayor’s role to tell Londoners who to be friends with. Instead, the Mayor will focus on creating an environment where Londoners find it easy and beneficial to have positive and regular contact with those around them” (2018: 30).

The Mayor of London’s report announced several key policies (2018: 30-38). The report announced the launch of the following:

- *The Family Fund* (a programme to bring together children and families from different backgrounds);
- *Sport Unites* (a programme using sport to improve social integration);
- *Social Integration Design Lab* (an initiative to enable “borough service leads to work with social design experts, citizens and public sector innovators to embed design principles into public service delivery”(2018: 35) using principles for social integration developed by academics and experienced partners);
- *Citizenship and Integration Initiative* (a programme designed in response to new research findings into “London identities” (2018: 37)).

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WORKPLACE

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

Part I: Previous academic research

The recent academic study of workplace diversity as related to ethnicity, nationality and religion centres on three main themes:

- racial and ethnic equality in the workplace (including unemployment);
- the often-precarious role of migrants in the labour market; and
- issues around religious dress sometimes in relation to human rights.

The breadth of recent academic work on race and ethnicity and workplace diversity is reflected in a major literature review on ethnic identity in the workplace (see Carrim 2019) and a special edition of the academic journal *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology* (see Plaut, Thomas and Hebl 2014).

Carrim's literature review demonstrates the maturity and scope of workplace diversity studies (albeit where such studies focus primarily on race and ethnicity). Previous work, especially from the US, has focused on the prejudiced attitudes of White Americans towards ethnic minorities, thereby decentring the voices of the very groups such research seeks to understand and support (Carrim 2019; see also Wildman and Davis 1996). Accordingly, the authors give equal weight to data from ethnic and religious subgroups and give special attention to circumstances in which a person is the only member of a minority group represented in a workplace. Early studies of "White privilege" (Wildman and Davis 1996) asserted the workplace as sites of "systems of privilege" including "the existence of subconscious, unintentional discrimination" (1996: 33).

Research has focused on the concept of "solos", described as being "the only individuals representing their ethnic group in a particular workplace" (Carrim 2019: 6, see also Niemann and Dovidio 1998 and Kenny and Briner 2013).

Much of Carrim's extensive review focuses the ways in which ethnic identities are challenged or threatened, and the results of discrimination: "anxiety, anger, helplessness, paranoia, hopelessness, resentment, frustration,[and] fear" (Carrim 2019: 8; see also Utsey et al 2002). Most of the commentary is rooted in business and management studies: exclusion from social groups at work and decision-making processes; "microaggressive" behaviour resulting in "micro-inequities"

(Rowe 1990). The present analysis is intended to complement this work with a more pronounced social science direction and use of nationally-representative data, absent from the studies reviewed here.

Plaut, Thomas and Hebl (2014) assert the significance of the workplace setting in relation to issues concerning race and ethnicity. Their approach is also useful when considering nationality and religion in the workplace. In the authors' own words:

One might argue that race and ethnicity influence the workplace setting more than any other setting. The workplace provides unique opportunities to express one's identity and to work interactively with others in various competitive and cooperative situations. The workplace also provides opportunities for the expression of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. People do not simply leave their racial and ethnic identities at home, and the workplace is not immune from societal forms of racial and ethnic bias. In short, race and ethnicity are salient in and matter in a variety of ways at work. (2014: 479)

Plaut, Thomas and Hebl outline gaps in the knowledge, including other factors, or "moderators", that shape experiences of discrimination (2014: 480). Whilst most of research reviewed by them is qualitative in nature, our project and this report attempt to answer their call for more analysis of moderators. As before, we analysed multiple factors – or "moderators" – such as sex/gender, age, region, occupation, employment status and income.

Themes in their special edition demonstrate the range of work being undertaken in the field: experience of tokenisation (Wingfield and Wingfield 2014); experiences of incivility and discrimination (Krings et al 2014); racial attitudes and perceptions of "workplace microaggressions" (Offermann et al 2014); examinations of devaluations and affirmations (Emerson and Murphy 2014); "metastereotypes" and self-esteem (Owuamalam and Zagefka 2014); "racial identity-based impression management" (Roberts, Cha and Kim 2014); social support and coping strategies (Linnabery, Stuhlmacher and Towler 2014); and "occupational socialization (sic)" Hagelskamp and Hughes 2014).

An in-depth review of all contributions to the special edition is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, some key characteristics of the work, and that reviewed by Carrim, are important to note. First, analysis in this field tends to be grounded in qualitative methods. Whilst the relevant theories and fieldwork data and conclusions are handled expertly, and with all due sensitivities, they do not provide insights into large-scale employment patterns, as pertaining to ethnicity or minority status, or provide evidence for the extent of the circumstances described. Second, whilst the analyses are sophisticated and the insights are undoubtedly useful, very little of the work attempts to establish a baseline measure of workplace diversity. In response to these obvious gaps and guided by McGregor-Smith words quoted below, the analysis offered below aims

to diversify the methods used to study workplace diversity and broaden the focus from ethnicity to include nationality and religion.

The data on the dynamics of religion in the UK, particularly in relation to equality, are limited (Purdam et al 2007). As the authors argue:

There is only limited evidence regarding the issue of equality in relation to religious identity in the UK. Much of the evidence in relation to non-Christian religions is abstracted from research about ethnicity. (2007: 156)

Scholars of religion have afforded little attention to religion and the workplace. This despite the fact that the workplace is increasingly diverse and provides a significant public space in which people from diverse faith backgrounds encounter one another (Hicks 2003). Given the classical business and leadership model, religion is invariably conceptualised as a private matter, yet, as Hicks argues, the religious commitments of employees inevitably find their way into the workplace. Hicks suggests an approach to religious diversity in the workplace labelled as “respectful pluralism”: in essence, the displacement of “top down” corporate interventions concerning religion and spirituality by employees being allowed to “bring their own religions to work” (2003: 2).

Within the US context attempts to accommodate religion and spirituality in the workplace stretch to at least the 1960s and the establishing of the Equal Employment Opportunity laws (Cash and Gray 2000). In the UK, under the European Union’s common framework to tackle unfair discrimination, the UK introduced new legislation to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in the workplace (Purdam et 2007). Hicks states:

The standard approaches in leadership studies, organizational culture, and human resource management pay inadequate attention to religious beliefs and practices at work. In models of the secular workplace, religion is clearly a “private” matter and should be excluded from “private” sector workplaces. (2003: 2)

The 4th National Survey of Ethnic Minorities found that a quarter of all respondents who believed they had been discriminated against in a job application thought that it was for a mixture of reasons to do with race and religion (Modood et al 1997).

In terms of religious dress in the workplace, a notable recent legal case – *Eweida v British Airways* – involved a female employee working at a British Airways check-in counter. She was refused permission to wear the cross over her uniform and informed that doing so would breach the company’s dress code. Despite British Airways permitting Sikh employees to wear the turban and Muslim employees to wear the hijab, Eweida’s claims of direct and indirect discrimination were unsuccessful (Vickers 2010).

Data from notable studies of religion in the UK relating to employment and the workplace are first, relatively old (see Weller, Purdam and Feldman 2001 and O’Beirne 2004) and, secondly, focused in the main on discrimination. Our work aims to update our understanding and to develop future lines of enquiry by establishing a baseline measure of workplace diversity across England and Wales.

Part 2: Recent policy

Baroness McGregor-Smith commissioned a study (McGregor-Smith 2012) to examine the barriers faced by people from ethnic minorities in the workplace and to consider what could be done to address them. Her report estimated that the potential benefit to the UK economy from full employment of workers from ethnic minorities is £24bn a year. The Review focused on economic concerns, employment and career prospects.

According to figures from *Business in the Community* (2015) used in the *McGregor-Smith Review*, 1 in 8 (12.5%) of the UK’s working age population in 2015 was from a “BME” background, yet BME individuals made up 10% of the workforce and held only 6% of the top management positions. Employment rates were lower for ethnic minorities as compared to White workers (63% and 75%, respectively).

More recent figures reveal that unemployment among the ethnic minority workers (taken as a whole) is higher than for the majority White population: 7% compared to 4% (where “workers” means the economically active population). For some groups, the discrepancy is more marked: 9% unemployment for Black workers; 8% unemployment for Bangladeshi and Pakistani workers. McGregor-Smith recommended:

- a Business in the Community Charter;
- the appointment of an Executive Sponsor for race; capturing ethnicity data and publicising progress;
- committing at board level to zero tolerance of harassment and bullying;
- making clear that supporting equality in the workplace is the responsibility of all leaders and managers; and
- taking action that supports ethnic minority career progression.

Despite the apparent interest from policy-makers and scholars, efforts to promote diversity and equality in the workplace appear to be declining for both BAME (the term is used interchangeably with “BME” throughout these sources) and White workers:

Worryingly the proportion of managers who report that they have a performance objective to promote equality at work has fallen from 41% in 2015 to 32% in 2018 –this figure has fallen almost equally for those from a White British (26% down from 32%) and BAME background (38% down from 48%). (Business in the Community 2018: 4)

Further, 1 in 4 BAME employees (25%) reported that they had witnessed or experienced racist harassment or bullying from managers in the last two years (2018: 4). Only a third of workers (37% in 2015, 38% in 2018) feel comfortable talking about race.

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APPENDIX B:

TABLES

DIVERSITY

A. BIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 1. Ethnic diversity is good for British society

Ethnic diversity is good for British society					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
19.9	33.3	26.5	10.5	6.6	3.1

Source: Survation

Variable: q7

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 2. Migrants are good for British society

Migrants are good for British society					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
14.9	31.5	29.8	11.9	8.5	3.3

Source: Survation

Variable: q38

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 3. Religious diversity is good for British society

Religious diversity is good for British society					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
13.4	27.1	30.9	12.5	9.5	6.6

Source: Survation

Variable: q22

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 4. My local community is ethnically diverse

My local community is ethnically diverse					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
19	34	21	16	7	4

Source: Survation

Variable: q3

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 5. My local community is diverse in terms of people being of different nationalities

My local community is diverse in terms of people being of different nationalities					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
18	36	20	15	6	5

Source: Survation

Variable: q34

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 6. My local community is religiously diverse

My local community is religiously diverse					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
13	26	25	13	6	16

Source: Survation

Variable: q18

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 7. Ethnic diversity is good for my local community

Ethnic diversity is good for my local community					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
25.2	37.9	21.6	8.4	5.6	1.3

Source: Survation

Variable: q8

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=6,106

Table 8. Migrants are good for my local community

Migrants are good for my local community					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
19.6	34.4	25.6	11.1	7.3	2.1

Source: Survation

Variable: q39

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=6,236

Table 9. Religious diversity is good for my local community

Religious diversity is good for my local community					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
22.1	35.1	25.6	8.7	6.5	2

Source: Survation

Variable: q23

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=7,094

Table 10. Ethnic diversity would be good for my local community

Ethnic diversity would be good for my local community					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
11.3	21.3	38.2	13	10.1	6.1

Source: Survation

Variable: q9

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=5,595

Table 11. Migrants would be good for my local community

Migrants would be good for my local community					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
7	17.4	41.4	15.1	11.9	7.1

Source: Survation

Variable: q40

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=5,465

Table 12. Religious diversity would be good for my local community

Religious diversity would be good for my local community					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
6.5	15.9	39.5	14	11.4	12.6

Source: Survation

Variable: q24

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=7,094

B. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 13. Predicting disagreement with the statement that ethnic diversity is good for British society

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.368	.066***	.692	.608	.787
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.259	.212	1.296	.856	1.963
Age: 35-44	.376	.200	1.457	.984	2.157
Age: 45-54	.694	.193***	2.001	1.370	2.922
Age: 55-64	.715	.194***	2.044	1.396	2.991
Age: 65-74	.776	.203***	2.173	1.460	3.233
Age: 75+	.648	.210**	1.912	1.266	2.888
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	-.169	.269	.844	.498	1.432
Ethnicity: Asian	-.421	.236	.656	.413	1.042
Ethnicity: Other	-.704	.300*	.494	.275	.890
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.147	.068*	.863	.756	.986
Religion: Other religion	-.380	.185*	.684	.476	.982
Local community ethnically diverse: Agrees (ref.)	-.595	.069*	.552	.482	.631
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: 2 decile	.190	.140	1.209	.920	1.590
BAME: 3 decile	-.106	.146	.900	.675	1.198

BAME: 4 decile	.245	.142	1.278	.968	1.687
BAME: 5 decile	.328	.151*	1.388	1.032	1.865
BAME: 6 decile	.304	.158	1.355	.994	1.847
BAME: 7 decile	.361	.158*	1.435	1.052	1.957
BAME: 8 decile	.423	.165*	1.526	1.104	2.110
BAME: 9 decile	.820	.188***	2.271	1.571	3.281
BAME: 10 decile	.750	.201***	2.117	1.429	3.138
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.273	.178	1.314	.927	1.863
Region: East of England	.488	.170**	1.630	1.167	2.276
Region: North East	.631	.211**	1.880	1.244	2.841
Region: North West	.407	.164*	1.502	1.088	2.073
Region: South East	.271	.163	1.312	.953	1.807
Region: South West	.370	.177*	1.448	1.023	2.050
Region: West Midlands	.297	.153	1.346	.997	1.818
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.240	.180	1.271	.894	1.809
Region: Wales	.699	.201***	2.011	1.357	2.981
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.056	.086	.945	.798	1.120
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.366	.108***	1.443	1.167	1.783
Education: No qualifications	.275	.082***	1.316	1.122	1.544
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.091	.212	.913	.603	1.383
Employment: Economically inactive	.077	.088	1.080	.908	1.284

Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)

Income: Less than £20,000	.178	.117	1.194	.950	1.501
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Income: £20,000-£39,000	.090	.106	1.094	.889	1.348
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Income: £40,000-£59,000	.078	.112	1.081	.868	1.345
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EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.410	.078***	.244	.210	.284
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GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)

GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.649	.080***	.523	.447	.611
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GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.620	.155***	.538	.397	.729
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GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.359	.121**	1.432	1.129	1.815
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Constant	-1.770	.284	.170		
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Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q7_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), d3_2 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded),

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.137; Nagelkerke = 0.223

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 11.853$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.158

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 8,078

Table 14. Predicting disagreement with the statement that migrants are good for British society

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.155	.062*	.856	.759	.967
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.240	.166	1.271	.918	1.759
Age: 35-44	.186	.159	1.204	.882	1.644
Age: 45-54	.226	.156	1.253	.923	1.701
Age: 55-64	.265	.158	1.303	.956	1.776
Age: 65-74	.066	.169	1.068	.766	1.489
Age: 75+	-.190	.180	.827	.581	1.176
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	.257	.219	1.293	.841	1.988
Ethnicity: Asian	-.162	.198	.850	.576	1.255
Ethnicity: Other	-.858	.280**	.424	.245	.733
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.132	.065*	.876	.771	.996
Religion: Muslim	-.311	.273	.733	.429	1.252
Religion: Other religion	-.190	.174	.827	.588	1.164
Local community nationally diverse: Agrees (ref.)	-.374	.064*	.688	.607	.780
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: decile	.173	.127	1.189	.927	1.525
COB Non-UK: decile	.090	.137	1.094	.836	1.432
COB Non-UK: decile	.092	.144	1.096	.828	1.453

COB Non-UK: 5 decile	.080	.142	1.084	.821	1.431
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	.426	.142**	1.531	1.158	2.024
COB Non-UK: 7 decile	.186	.143	1.204	.910	1.593
COB Non-UK: 8 decile	.443	.149**	1.557	1.163	2.085
COB Non-UK: 9 decile	.436	.159**	1.546	1.132	2.111
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	.592	.217**	1.808	1.182	2.765
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.654	.185***	1.924	1.340	2.762
Region: East of England	.511	.189**	1.667	1.150	2.416
Region: North East	.931	.221***	2.537	1.645	3.913
Region: North West	.750	.187***	2.118	1.469	3.053
Region: South East	.269	.180	1.308	.920	1.860
Region: South West	.483	.193**	1.621	1.110	2.367
Region: West Midlands	.672	.183***	1.958	1.367	2.804
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.560	.197**	1.750	1.191	2.573
Region: Wales	.960	.210***	2.611	1.731	3.940
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.061	.078	.941	.807	1.097
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.452	.104***	1.571	1.281	1.926
Education: No qualifications	.300	.077***	1.350	1.160	1.571
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.061	.183	.941	.657	1.348
Employment: Economically inactive	.053	.083	1.054	.896	1.240
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					

Income: Less than £20,000	.258	.112*	1.294	1.040	1.610
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.109	.103	1.115	.912	1.363
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.163	.107	1.177	.954	1.451
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.371	.071***	.254	.221	.292
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.417	.073***	.659	.572	.760
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.898	.163***	.407	.296	.561
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.387	.118**	1.472	1.168	1.855
Constant	-1.597	.267	.203		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q38_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), d34_2 (recoded), COBNonUK_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded),

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.118; Nagelkerke = 0.184

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 6.930$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.544

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 7,913

Table 15. Predicting disagreement with the statement that religious diversity is good for British society

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.351	.064***	.704	.622	.798
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.311	.168	1.365	.982	1.896
Age: 35-44	.105	.162	1.110	.808	1.526
Age: 45-54	.343	.158*	1.409	1.034	1.920
Age: 55-64	.349	.160*	1.418	1.037	1.938
Age: 65-74	.189	.170	1.209	.865	1.688
Age: 75+ 6	-.064	.180	.938	.659	1.335
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	-.538	.258*	.584	.352	.969
Ethnicity: Asian	-.863	.225***	.422	.271	.656
Ethnicity: Other	-.443	.232	.642	.408	1.012
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.237	.066***	.789	.693	.898
Religion: Muslim	-.343	.285	.710	.406	1.241
Religion: Other religion	-.544	.186**	.580	.403	.836
Local community religiously diverse: Agrees (ref.)	-.487	.066***	.615	.540	.699
Min. Rel.: deciles 1 decile (ref.)					
Min. Rel.: decile	-.203	.137	.816	.624	1.068
Min. Rel.: decile	-.080	.131	.923	.714	1.193
Min. Rel.: decile	-.087	.143	.917	.692	1.214

Min. Rel.: 5 decile	-.026	.146	.975	.733	1.296
Min. Rel.: 6 decile	.006	.149	1.006	.752	1.346
Min. Rel.: 7 decile	.449	.153**	1.567	1.160	2.115
Min. Rel.: 8 decile	-.170	.153	.844	.626	1.138
Min. Rel.: 9 decile	.319	.160*	1.376	1.006	1.884
Min. Rel.: 10 decile	.199	.176	1.221	.864	1.725
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.079	.162	1.082	.788	1.486
Region: East of England	-.020	.154	.980	.724	1.326
Region: North East	.231	.189	1.260	.870	1.825
Region: North West	.050	.146	1.051	.789	1.400
Region: South East	.010	.143	1.010	.763	1.337
Region: South West	.078	.160	1.081	.790	1.480
Region: West Midlands	-.185	.143	.831	.628	1.099
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.019	.155	1.019	.752	1.381
Region: Wales	.153	.179	1.165	.821	1.654
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	.056	.081	1.058	.903	1.240
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.071	.105	1.073	.874	1.318
Education: No qualifications	.059	.075	1.060	.915	1.229
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	.040	.188	1.041	.721	1.504
Employment: Economically inactive	.284	.085***	1.329	1.125	1.569
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					

Income: Less than £20,000	.157	.111	1.170	.941	1.455
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.082	.100	1.086	.893	1.320
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.111	.104	1.117	.912	1.369
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.978	.068***	.376	.329	.430
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.679	.075***	.507	.438	.587
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.584	.137***	.558	.426	.730
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.265	.125*	1.303	1.020	1.664
Constant	-.493	.241	.611		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q22_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), d18_2 (recoded), MinRel_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded),

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.113; Nagelkerke = 0.169

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 11.952$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.153

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 6,876

Table 16. Predicting disagreement with the statement that ethnic diversity is good for the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.202	.096*	.817	.677	.987
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.593	.282*	1.809	1.041	3.145
Age: 35-44	.565	.274*	1.759	1.027	3.013
Age: 45-54	.795	.268**	2.215	1.311	3.741
Age: 55-64	.957	.270***	2.603	1.534	4.416
Age: 65-74	.653	.286*	1.921	1.096	3.367
Age: 75+	.484	.300	1.623	.901	2.922
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)	-.843	.227***	.430	.276	.672
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.264	.100**	.768	.631	.934
Religion: Other religion	-.250	.218	.779	.508	1.194
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	-.236	.212	.790	.521	1.198
Region: East of England	.267	.187	1.306	.906	1.883
Region: North East	.516	.249*	1.676	1.028	2.732
Region: North West	.228	.172	1.256	.896	1.760
Region: South East	-.218	.172	.804	.574	1.126
Region: South West	-.391	.220	.677	.440	1.041
Region: West Midlands	.226	.173	1.254	.894	1.758
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.506	.192**	1.659	1.138	2.420

Region: Wales	-.051	.264	.950	.567	1.593
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.175	.122	.839	.660	1.067
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.420	.164*	1.521	1.103	2.098
Education: No qualifications	.338	.121**	1.403	1.106	1.779
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	.004	.271	1.004	.590	1.706
Employment: Economically inactive	.320	.127*	1.377	1.073	1.766
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.065	.170	1.067	.765	1.489
Income: £20,000-£39,000	-.121	.157	.886	.651	1.206
Income: £40,000-£59,000	-.039	.164	.962	.697	1.326
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.510	.114***	.221	.176	.276
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.601	.112***	.548	.440	.684
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	-.191	.151	.826	.614	1.111
Constant	-1.724	.309	.178		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q8_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), d3_2 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_4 (recoded),

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.115; Nagelkerke = 0.202

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 12.408$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.134

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,115

Table 17. Predicting disagreement with the statement that migrants are good for the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.113	.085	.893	.756	1.056
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.194	.211	1.215	.803	1.838
Age: 35-44	.524	.200**	1.688	1.141	2.499
Age: 45-54	.594	.199**	1.811	1.226	2.675
Age: 55-64	.444	.205*	1.559	1.043	2.329
Age: 65-74	.192	.222	1.212	.784	1.872
Age: 75+	.227	.236	1.255	.790	1.991
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Asian	-.044	.223	.957	.618	1.482
Ethnicity: Other	-.395	.221	.674	.437	1.039
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.160	.090	.853	.715	1.017
Religion: Muslim	-.347	.289	.707	.401	1.245
Religion: Other religion	-.161	.213	.851	.561	1.292
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: decile	.335	.224	1.398	.902	2.167
COB Non-UK: decile	.125	.228	1.134	.725	1.772
COB Non-UK: decile	-.172	.244	.842	.522	1.358
COB Non-UK: 5 decile	-.081	.231	.922	.586	1.451
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	.310	.227	1.363	.874	2.126

COB Non-UK: 7 decile	.119	.224	1.126	.726	1.747
COB Non-UK: 8 decile	.297	.227	1.346	.863	2.099
COB Non-UK: 9 decile	-.003	.241	.997	.622	1.598
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	.347	.278	1.415	.820	2.441
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.211	.217	1.235	.807	1.891
Region: East of England	.138	.226	1.148	.737	1.786
Region: North East	.380	.295	1.462	.821	2.606
Region: North West	.414	.218	1.514	.987	2.322
Region: South East	.052	.205	1.053	.704	1.574
Region: South West	.122	.235	1.130	.712	1.792
Region: West Midlands	.511	.204*	1.668	1.117	2.490
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.593	.237*	1.809	1.137	2.877
Region: Wales	.358	.276	1.430	.833	2.456
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.152	.124	.859	.673	1.095
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.473	.147***	1.606	1.203	2.143
Education: No qualifications	.297	.107**	1.346	1.091	1.661
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.327	.261	.721	.432	1.204
Employment: Economically inactive	.198	.113	1.219	.977	1.520
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.212	.155	1.236	.912	1.675
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.120	.143	1.127	.852	1.491

Income: £40,000-£59,000	.164	.149	1.178	.880	1.577
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.475	.098***	.229	.189	.277
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.168	.098	.845	.698	1.023
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	-.003	.136	.997	.763	1.302
Constant	-1.814	.349	.163		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q39_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_4 (recoded),

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.106; Nagelkerke = 0.169

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 11.868$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.157

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,138

Table 18. Predicting disagreement with the statement that religious diversity is good for the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.184	.105	.832	.677	1.022
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.613	.276*	1.846	1.074	3.172
Age: 35-44	.625	.269*	1.868	1.101	3.167
Age: 45-54	.953	.263***	2.593	1.550	4.337
Age: 55-64	.937	.269***	2.552	1.506	4.326
Age: 65-74	.832	.281**	2.298	1.324	3.987
Age: 75+	.566	.299	1.762	.981	3.165
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)	-.832	.236***	.435	.274	.691
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.487	.109***	.615	.496	.761
Religion: Muslim	-.119	.350	.888	.447	1.765
Religion: Other religion	-.635	.269*	.530	.313	.897
Min. Rel.: 1 quintile (ref.)					
Min. Rel.: 2 quintile	-.060	.194	.942	.644	1.377
Min. Rel.: 3 quintile	.182	.193	1.200	.821	1.753
Min. Rel.: 4 quintile	.270	.197	1.310	.891	1.928
Min. Rel.: 5 quintile	.409	.211	1.505	.996	2.275
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.308	.239	1.361	.853	2.173
Region: East of England	.251	.228	1.285	.822	2.008

Region: North East	.491	.295	1.634	.917	2.910
Region: North West	.349	.197	1.418	.964	2.084
Region: South East	.145	.202	1.156	.778	1.718
Region: South West	-.143	.260	.867	.520	1.444
Region: West Midlands	.218	.193	1.243	.851	1.816
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.250	.233	1.284	.813	2.027
Region: Wales	.229	.306	1.257	.690	2.290
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.032	.156	.968	.713	1.315
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.112	.179	1.118	.787	1.588
Education: No qualifications	.209	.126	1.233	.962	1.580
Employment: Not Employed (ref. Employed)	-.296	.131*	.744	.575	.962
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.201	.185	1.223	.850	1.758
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.168	.168	1.183	.851	1.646
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.246	.175	1.279	.908	1.801
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.328	.119***	.265	.210	.334
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.613	.123***	.542	.426	.690
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	-.343	.166*	.709	.513	.982
Constant	-1.614	.392	.199		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q23_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), MinRel_quintiles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_4 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.117; Nagelkerke = 0.194

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 13.875$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.085

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 3,123

Table 19. Predicting disagreement with the statement that ethnic diversity would be good for the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.378	.083***	.685	.582	.807
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.142	.276	1.152	.671	1.978
Age: 35-44	.305	.257	1.357	.820	2.244
Age: 45-54	.246	.249	1.279	.785	2.082
Age: 55-64	.366	.249	1.442	.886	2.348
Age: 65-74	.596	.259*	1.814	1.092	3.014
Age: 75+	.547	.267*	1.728	1.023	2.918
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)	-.535	.232*	.586	.372	.923
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.071	.086	1.074	.906	1.272
Religion: Other religion	.386	.244	1.472	.913	2.372
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: decile	.265	.150	1.303	.972	1.748
BAME: decile	-.310	.161	.733	.535	1.005
BAME: decile	.012	.157	1.012	.743	1.377
BAME: 5 decile	.037	.173	1.038	.740	1.457
BAME: 6 decile	-.040	.187	.961	.666	1.387
BAME: 7 decile	.191	.193	1.211	.830	1.767
BAME: 8 decile	.118	.210	1.125	.745	1.698
BAME: 9 decile	.678	.271*	1.970	1.159	3.350

BAME: 10 decile	.501	.323	1.650	.876	3.108
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.523	.293	1.687	.950	2.996
Region: East of England	.342	.285	1.407	.804	2.462
Region: North East	.739	.313*	2.094	1.134	3.867
Region: North West	.580	.278*	1.786	1.036	3.081
Region: South East	.235	.277	1.265	.735	2.180
Region: South West	.663	.285*	1.941	1.110	3.395
Region: West Midlands	.112	.277	1.118	.649	1.925
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.437	.287	1.548	.882	2.717
Region: Wales	.756	.305*	2.129	1.170	3.874
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.180	.100	.835	.686	1.017
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.270	.135*	1.310	1.005	1.709
Education: No qualifications	.197	.102	1.218	.998	1.487
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	.299	.280	1.349	.779	2.336
Employment: Economically inactive	-.085	.114	.919	.735	1.149
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	-.056	.148	.946	.707	1.265
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.033	.133	1.034	.797	1.342
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.024	.140	1.025	.779	1.347
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.238	.094***	.290	.241	.349
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					

GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.726	.103***	.484	.396	.592
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.511	.180**	.600	.422	.853
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.316	.158	1.372	1.006	1.872
Constant	-1.067	.398	.344		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q9_32 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), BAME:S_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.132; Nagelkerke = 0.192

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 11.789$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.161

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,042

Table 20. Predicting disagreement with the statement that migrants would be good for the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.162	.082*	.851	.724	.999
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.707	.283*	2.028	1.165	3.532
Age: 35-44	.457	.272	1.580	.926	2.695
Age: 45-54	.317	.265	1.373	.816	2.310
Age: 55-64	.505	.264	1.657	.987	2.781
Age: 65-74	.454	.275	1.575	.918	2.702
Age: 75+	.047	.284	1.048	.600	1.830
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Asian	-.872	.416*	.418	.185	.945
Ethnicity: Other	-.399	.280	.671	.387	1.161
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.022	.086	1.022	.864	1.209
Religion: Muslim	-1.193	.911	.303	.051	1.809
Religion: Other religion	.257	.267	1.293	.766	2.184
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: decile	.030	.145	1.030	.775	1.368
COB Non-UK: decile	-.036	.160	.965	.705	1.322
COB Non-UK: decile	-.062	.166	.940	.679	1.300
COB Non-UK: 5 decile	-.122	.170	.885	.634	1.235
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	.425	.179*	1.530	1.077	2.173

COB Non-UK: 7 decile	-.025	.181	.976	.684	1.393
COB Non-UK: 8 decile	.382	.201	1.466	.988	2.174
COB Non-UK: 9 decile	.530	.219*	1.699	1.105	2.612
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	.989	.449*	2.688	1.115	6.481
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.943	.385**	2.569	1.207	5.466
Region: East of England	.921	.388**	2.513	1.175	5.372
Region: North East	1.706	.409***	5.506	2.471	12.272
Region: North West	1.205	.386**	3.337	1.566	7.115
Region: South East	.956	.376**	2.600	1.243	5.438
Region: South West	1.055	.388**	2.871	1.342	6.141
Region: West Midlands	.954	.390*	2.597	1.208	5.583
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	1.111	.390**	3.037	1.415	6.520
Region: Wales	1.228	.403**	3.416	1.551	7.521
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.053	.094	.948	.789	1.140
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.543	.135***	1.722	1.323	2.242
Education: No qualifications	.359	.102***	1.432	1.173	1.747
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.181	.257	.834	.504	1.381
Employment: Economically inactive	.070	.112	1.073	.861	1.336
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.161	.149	1.175	.878	1.573
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.119	.135	1.127	.865	1.468

Income: £40,000-£59,000	.064	.142	1.066	.807	1.408
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.334	.091***	.263	.220	.315
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.581	.099***	.560	.461	.679
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.973	.204***	.378	.253	.564
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.274	.158	1.316	.965	1.795
Constant	-2.005	.484	.135		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q40_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), COBNonUK_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.149; Nagelkerke = 0.213

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 7.426$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.491

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 3,946

Table 21. Predicting disagreement with the statement that religious diversity would be good for the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.444	.070***	.641	.559	.736
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Asian	-.620	.292*	.538	.304	.953
Ethnicity: Other	-.721	.237**	.486	.305	.774
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.198	.075**	.821	.709	.950
Religion: Muslim	-.510	.472	.601	.238	1.516
Religion: Other religion	-.260	.236	.771	.486	1.224
MIN. REL.: 1 quintile (ref.)					
MIN. REL.: 2 quintile	.023	.098	1.023	.844	1.240
MIN. REL.: 3 quintile	.061	.114	1.063	.850	1.329
MIN. REL.: 4 quintile	.188	.126	1.206	.943	1.544
MIN. REL.: 5 quintile	.293	.162	1.341	.975	1.844
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	-.343	.208	.710	.472	1.068
Region: East of England	-.232	.200	.793	.536	1.172
Region: North East	.182	.229	1.200	.766	1.878
Region: North West	-.245	.193	.782	.536	1.142
Region: South East	-.157	.188	.854	.591	1.236
Region: South West	-.016	.202	.984	.662	1.462
Region: West Midlands	-.314	.191	.731	.502	1.064

Region: Yorkshire and Humber	-.117	.195	.890	.607	1.304
Region: Wales	-.013	.219	.988	.643	1.517
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	.175	.087*	1.191	1.005	1.411
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.249	.119*	1.282	1.016	1.618
Education: No qualifications	.078	.086	1.081	.914	1.280
Employment: Not Employed (ref. Employed)	-.048	.076	.953	.821	1.107
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	-.135	.126	.874	.682	1.119
Income: £20,000-£39,000	-.157	.114	.855	.684	1.068
Income: £40,000-£59,000	-.065	.119	.937	.742	1.182
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.002	.077***	.367	.316	.427
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.598	.084***	.550	.467	.648
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.601	.154***	.548	.405	.742
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.190	.144	1.209	.912	1.603
Constant	.180	.224	1.197		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q24_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), MinRel_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_3 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.105; Nagelkerke = 0.148

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 11.804$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.160

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,657

CHANGE

A. BIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 22. Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
21.8	28.2	25.2	11.1	9.5	4.1

Source: Survation

Variable: q4

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 23. The number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

The number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
31.1	28.9	19.6	9	7.7	3.8

Source: Survation

Variable: q35

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 24. Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
17.8	25.6	28.6	11.1	7.6	9.3

Source: Survation

Variable: q19

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=11,701

Table 25. Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
20	23.9	25.2	15.1	12.1	3.6

Source: Survation

Variable: q5

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=5,595

Table 26. The number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

The number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
26.4	27.1	21.4	11.6	9.9	3.5

Source: Survation

Variable: q36

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=6,236

Table 27. Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
19.3	24.5	27.2	14	11.1	3.9

Source: Survation

Variable: q20

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=4,607

Table 28. Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too in the next 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
7.6	19.8	34	18.2	10.7	9.8

Source: Survation

Variable: q6

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=5,595

Table 29. The number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

The number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the past 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
10.9	19.4	33.4	16.6	7.8	11.9

Source: Survation

Variable: q37

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=5,465

Table 30. Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years					
%					
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
6.7	14.4	36.1	16.3	7.4	19.1

Source: Survation

Variable: q21

Data weighted with variable: weights

n=4,607

B. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 31. Predicting agreement with the statement that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in Britain

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.174	.050***	.840	.763	.926
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	-.265	.178	.767	.541	1.087
Ethnicity: Asian	.450	.153**	1.568	1.162	2.116
Ethnicity: Black	-.123	.148	.884	.661	1.182
Ethnicity: Other	.028	.407	1.028	.463	2.282
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.309	.053***	1.362	1.227	1.512
Religion: Jewish	-.139	.230	.870	.555	1.366
Religion: Hindu	.389	.279	1.476	.855	2.549
Religion: Muslim	.308	.172	1.360	.971	1.907
Religion: Sikh	.060	.301	1.062	.588	1.915
Religion: Other religion	.668	.218**	1.950	1.272	2.989
Local community ethnically diverse: Agrees (ref.)	.178	.053**	1.194	1.076	1.326
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: 2 decile	.140	.113	1.151	.923	1.434
BAME: 3 decile	.087	.114	1.090	.872	1.364
BAME: 4 decile	.077	.114	1.080	.863	1.350
BAME: 5 decile	.188	.120	1.207	.954	1.527

BAME: 6 decile	.115	.126	1.121	.875	1.437
BAME: 7 decile	.087	.125	1.091	.853	1.395
BAME: 8 decile	.386	.129**	1.470	1.142	1.893
BAME: 9 decile	.206	.146	1.229	.923	1.637
BAME: 10 decile	.621	.153**	1.860	1.378	2.512
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.103	.132	1.108	.857	1.434
Region: East of England	.197	.128	1.217	.946	1.566
Region: North East	.373	.163*	1.452	1.055	1.999
Region: North West	.196	.120	1.217	.962	1.539
Region: South East	.105	.120	1.110	.878	1.404
Region: South West	-.004	.133	.996	.768	1.292
Region: West Midlands	-.011	.112	.989	.794	1.231
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.155	.132	1.167	.902	1.511
Region: Wales	.258	.153	1.294	.958	1.746
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.047	.069	.954	.832	1.093
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.311	.086***	1.365	1.152	1.616
Education: No qualifications	.302	.058***	1.352	1.206	1.516
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.146	.145	.864	.650	1.149
Employment: Economically inactive	.009	.055	1.009	.906	1.124
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.399	.087**	1.491	1.256	1.770

Income: £20,000-£39,000	.270	.078**	1.310	1.125	1.525
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.219	.081*	1.244	1.061	1.459
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.130	.052***	.323	.292	.357
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.590	.058***	.554	.495	.621
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.558	.097***	.572	.473	.693
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.149	.120	1.160	.918	1.467
Constant	.076	.161	1.079		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q4_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5 (recoded), d18a_6 (recoded), d3_2 (recoded), BAME: _deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats, d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.141; Nagelkerke = 0.188

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 10.515$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.231

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 8,033

Table 32. Predicting agreement with the statement that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in Britain

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.191	.055***	.826	.742	.920
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.190	.137	1.209	.924	1.582
Age: 35-44	.370	.131**	1.448	1.120	1.871
Age: 45-54	.201	.130	1.223	.948	1.578
Age: 55-64	.465	.132***	1.591	1.229	2.060
Age: 65-74	.388	.142**	1.473	1.115	1.947
Age: 75+	.287	.150	1.333	.994	1.788
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	.175	.198	1.191	.807	1.757
Ethnicity: Asian	.382	.124**	1.465	1.149	1.867
Ethnicity: Other	.314	.160*	1.368	1.000	1.872
Local community nationally diverse: Agrees (ref.)	.283	.057***	1.327	1.186	1.484
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: decile	.231	.118*	1.259	1.000	1.587
COB Non-UK: decile	.339	.125**	1.403	1.099	1.792
COB Non-UK: decile	.188	.130	1.206	.935	1.557
COB Non-UK: 5 decile	.203	.128	1.225	.953	1.575
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	.388	.130**	1.474	1.142	1.902
COB Non-UK: 7 decile	.275	.125*	1.316	1.029	1.682
COB Non-UK: 8 decile	.484	.130***	1.623	1.257	2.096

COB Non-UK: 9 decile	.342	.139*	1.407	1.072	1.846
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	.747	.177***	2.110	1.492	2.985
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.393	.152**	1.482	1.099	1.998
Region: East of England	.255	.153	1.290	.956	1.741
Region: North East	.668	.189***	1.951	1.348	2.825
Region: North West	.421	.152**	1.524	1.132	2.053
Region: South East	.080	.144	1.084	.818	1.437
Region: South West	.098	.159	1.103	.807	1.508
Region: West Midlands	.313	.148*	1.367	1.022	1.829
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.257	.162	1.293	.941	1.776
Region: Wales	.427	.180*	1.533	1.077	2.182
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.468	.092***	1.596	1.332	1.914
Education: No qualifications	.378	.066***	1.459	1.281	1.660
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.090	.159	.914	.669	1.249
Employment: Economically inactive	-.086	.074	.917	.793	1.061
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.585	.097***	1.795	1.483	2.172
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.226	.089*	1.254	1.054	1.492
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.219	.093*	1.244	1.038	1.492
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.423	.059***	.241	.215	.270
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					

GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.540	.063***	.583	.514	.660
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.832	.127***	.435	.340	.558
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.405	.115***	1.499	1.196	1.878
Constant	-1.374	.220	.253		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q35_2 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), q34_2 (recoded), COBNonUK_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.163; Nagelkerke = 0.226

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 14.592$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.068

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 7,893

Table 33. Predicting agreement with the statement that religious diversity has increased too quickly in Britain

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.154	.054**	.858	.771	.953
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.211	.118	1.235	.979	1.558
Age: 35-44	-.141	.115	.868	.693	1.089
Age: 45-54	.015	.115	1.016	.811	1.271
Age: 55-64	.038	.119	1.039	.823	1.313
Age: 65-74	.007	.131	1.007	.779	1.302
Age: 75+	.095	.141	1.100	.835	1.449
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	-.148	.188	.862	.597	1.246
Ethnicity: Asian	.410	.156**	1.507	1.110	2.047
Ethnicity: Black	.139	.155	1.149	.848	1.556
Ethnicity: Other	.603	.418	1.828	.805	4.151
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.134	.058*	1.143	1.021	1.280
Religion: Jewish	-.611	.239*	.543	.340	.868
Religion: Hindu	.331	.278	1.392	.808	2.400
Religion: Muslim	.003	.176	1.003	.710	1.418
Religion: Sikh	.036	.309	1.036	.566	1.899
Religion: Other religion	.493	.224*	1.637	1.054	2.541
Local community religiously diverse: Agrees (ref.)	.377	.056***	1.458	1.307	1.626

Min. Rel.: deciles 1 decile (ref.)

Min. Rel.: 2 decile	-.121	.122	.886	.698	1.126
Min. Rel.: 3 decile	-.015	.117	.986	.784	1.239
Min. Rel.: 4 decile	.034	.127	1.035	.807	1.327
Min. Rel.: 5 decile	-.053	.129	.949	.736	1.222
Min. Rel.: 6 decile	-.074	.132	.929	.718	1.202
Min. Rel.: 7 decile	.050	.137	1.051	.804	1.374
Min. Rel.: 8 decile	.196	.130	1.217	.942	1.572
Min. Rel.: 9 decile	.157	.139	1.171	.892	1.537
Min. Rel.: 10 decile	.380	.148**	1.462	1.093	1.956

Region: London (ref.)

Region: East Midlands	.155	.132	1.168	.901	1.514
Region: East of England	.200	.128	1.222	.951	1.570
Region: North East	.385	.160*	1.470	1.073	2.014
Region: North West	.151	.119	1.163	.921	1.470
Region: South East	.101	.117	1.106	.880	1.391
Region: South West	-.160	.134	.852	.655	1.108
Region: West Midlands	-.184	.114	.832	.665	1.040
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.067	.129	1.069	.830	1.377
Region: Wales	.008	.152	1.008	.749	1.357

Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)**Education: Degree (ref.)**

Education: Qualifications other than degree	.351	.092***	1.421	1.186	1.702
Education: No qualifications	.273	.063***	1.314	1.163	1.486

Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.211	.157	.810	.595	1.101
Employment: Economically inactive	-.040	.073	.961	.832	1.109
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.292	.093**	1.339	1.116	1.606
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.176	.082*	1.192	1.015	1.401
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.142	.086	1.152	.974	1.363
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.925	.055***	.397	.356	.442
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.541	.063***	.582	.515	.659
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.528	.106***	.590	.479	.726
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.120	.124	1.127	.884	1.437
Constant	-.009	.193	.991		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q19_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5 (recoded), d18a_6 (recoded), d18_2 (recoded), MinRel_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.110; Nagelkerke = 0.147

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 12.749$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.121

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 6,804

Table 34. Predicting agreement with the statement that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.214	.069**	.807	.704	.925
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	-.176	.143	.838	.634	1.109
Age: 35-44	-.319	.139	.727	.554	.955
Age: 45-54	-.269	.140	.764	.581	1.006
Age: 55-64	-.493	.148**	.611	.457	.816
Age: 65-74	-.704	.166***	.495	.357	.685
Age: 75+	-1.139	.183***	.320	.224	.458
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	-.117	.237	.890	.559	1.417
Ethnicity: Asian	.065	.177	1.067	.754	1.510
Ethnicity: Black	-.315	.173	.729	.520	1.024
Ethnicity: Other	.461	.521	1.586	.571	4.406
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.339	.075***	1.403	1.211	1.626
Religion: Jewish	.011	.277	1.011	.587	1.741
Religion: Hindu	.915	.320**	2.497	1.334	4.676
Religion: Muslim	.225	.194	1.252	.855	1.833
Religion: Other religion	.786	.219***	2.194	1.427	3.373
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: 2 decile	.281	.198	1.324	.898	1.953

BAME: 3 decile	.223	.200	1.250	.845	1.849
BAME: 4 decile	.182	.198	1.199	.814	1.767
BAME: 5 decile	.404	.199*	1.498	1.014	2.213
BAME: 6 decile	.471	.202*	1.601	1.077	2.380
BAME: 7 decile	.576	.196**	1.780	1.211	2.615
BAME: 8 decile	.869	.199***	2.383	1.615	3.518
BAME: 9 decile	.510	.213*	1.666	1.097	2.530
BAME: 10 decile	1.125	.218***	3.081	2.010	4.722
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	-.080	.161	.923	.673	1.265
Region: East of England	.070	.160	1.072	.784	1.467
Region: North East	.266	.223	1.305	.842	2.022
Region: North West	.123	.145	1.131	.851	1.503
Region: South East	-.159	.146	.853	.641	1.135
Region: South West	-.211	.180	.810	.569	1.153
Region: West Midlands	-.007	.130	.993	.769	1.282
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.240	.170	1.271	.910	1.775
Region: Wales	-.177	.217	.838	.547	1.283
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	.099	.110	1.104	.891	1.369
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.400	.123***	1.492	1.173	1.899
Education: No qualifications	.351	.081***	1.421	1.213	1.664
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.007	.182	.993	.695	1.419

Employment: Economically inactive	.057	.095	1.058	.879	1.274
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.377	.120**	1.458	1.153	1.845
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.084	.108	1.087	.881	1.342
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.163	.112	1.176	.945	1.465
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.077	.072***	.341	.296	.392
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.404	.081***	.668	.570	.782
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.468	.144***	.626	.472	.831
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.237	.164	1.268	.919	1.750
Constant	-.079	.262	.924		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q5_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5 (recoded), d18a_5 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.133; Nagelkerke = 0.178

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 10.318$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.243

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,062

Table 35. Predicting agreement with the statement that the number of migrants has increased too quickly in the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.034	.138	1.034	.789	1.356
Age: 35-44	.045	.136	1.046	.801	1.365
Age: 45-54	-.025	.138	.976	.745	1.278
Age: 55-64	-.086	.143	.917	.693	1.214
Age: 65-74	-.203	.159	.816	.597	1.116
Age: 75+	-.389	.175*	.678	.481	.955
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)	.310	.107**	1.364	1.106	1.681
Religion: Religious (ref. Not religious)	.446	.070***	1.562	1.361	1.793
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: decile	.390	.188**	1.477	1.021	2.136
COB Non-UK: decile	.373	.193	1.452	.996	2.118
COB Non-UK: decile	.258	.195	1.295	.884	1.896
COB Non-UK: 5 decile	.276	.189	1.318	.909	1.910
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	.582	.186**	1.789	1.241	2.579
COB Non-UK: 7 decile	.627	.178***	1.872	1.321	2.654
COB Non-UK: 8 decile	.679	.182***	1.972	1.380	2.818
COB Non-UK: 9 decile	.364	.188	1.439	.996	2.079
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	1.081	.215***	2.947	1.932	4.494
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.123	.169	1.131	.812	1.575

Region: East of England	.237	.168	1.267	.911	1.762
Region: North East	.042	.236	1.043	.656	1.657
Region: North West	.331	.166*	1.393	1.007	1.928
Region: South East	.101	.154	1.107	.818	1.497
Region: South West	-.363	.183*	.696	.486	.995
Region: West Midlands	.403	.157**	1.496	1.100	2.034
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.375	.186*	1.455	1.009	2.096
Region: Wales	.237	.220	1.268	.823	1.953
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.432	.125***	1.541	1.207	1.967
Education: No qualifications	.284	.080***	1.328	1.136	1.552
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.570	.190**	.566	.390	.821
Employment: Economically inactive	-.214	.094*	.808	.672	.970
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.568	.119***	1.765	1.399	2.228
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.248	.105*	1.282	1.043	1.576
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.276	.110*	1.318	1.063	1.634
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.072	.072***	.342	.297	.394
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.494	.080***	.610	.522	.714
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.495	.134***	.610	.468	.793
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.214	.172	1.238	.885	1.733
Constant	-.247	.254	.781		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q36_3 (recoded), d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_12 (recoded), COBNonUK_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.133; Nagelkerke = 0.179

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 15.436$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.051

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,097

Table 36. Predicting agreement with the statement that religious diversity has increased too quickly in the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.127	.079	.881	.754	1.029
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.144	.153	1.155	.855	1.561
Age: 35-44	-.243	.151	.784	.583	1.055
Age: 45-54	-.111	.153	.895	.662	1.208
Age: 55-64	-.547	.166***	.578	.418	.801
Age: 65-74	-.641	.181***	.527	.369	.752
Age: 75+	-.842	.202***	.431	.290	.640
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	-.274	.249	.760	.466	1.239
Ethnicity: Asian	.364	.185*	1.439	1.001	2.068
Ethnicity: Other	-.079	.183	.924	.645	1.323
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.242	.085**	1.274	1.078	1.505
Religion: Jewish	-.303	.310	.739	.403	1.355
Religion: Muslim	.325	.204	1.384	.928	2.065
Religion: Other religion	.525	.212*	1.690	1.115	2.562
Min. Rel.: deciles 1 decile (ref.)					
Min. Rel.: decile	.164	.227	1.178	.755	1.839
Min. Rel.: decile	.201	.215	1.223	.802	1.865
Min. Rel.: decile	.252	.241	1.287	.803	2.062

Min. Rel.: 5 decile	.507	.221*	1.660	1.076	2.562
Min. Rel.: 6 decile	.741	.222***	2.098	1.359	3.239
Min. Rel.: 7 decile	.505	.225*	1.657	1.067	2.573
Min. Rel.: 8 decile	.852	.214***	2.345	1.542	3.566
Min. Rel.: 9 decile	.842	.219***	2.321	1.512	3.562
Min. Rel.: 10 decile	1.173	.228***	3.232	2.068	5.052
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.534	.182**	1.707	1.196	2.436
Region: East of England	-.036	.177	.965	.683	1.364
Region: North East	.396	.234	1.485	.939	2.351
Region: North West	.041	.156	1.042	.767	1.414
Region: South East	-.163	.153	.849	.629	1.148
Region: South West	-.220	.197	.803	.546	1.180
Region: West Midlands	-.170	.145	.843	.635	1.120
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	-.016	.184	.984	.687	1.411
Region: Wales	-.022	.239	.978	.613	1.563
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.015	.124	.985	.772	1.256
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.658	.141***	1.930	1.465	2.544
Education: No qualifications	.191	.092*	1.211	1.011	1.449
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.276	.237	.759	.477	1.207
Employment: Economically inactive	-.138	.108	.871	.705	1.076
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					

Income: Less than £20,000	.507	.135***	1.661	1.274	2.165
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.276	.120*	1.318	1.042	1.667
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.295	.125*	1.343	1.052	1.714
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.871	.084***	.419	.355	.493
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.310	.094***	.734	.610	.882
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.161	.155	.851	.628	1.153
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.090	.182	1.094	.766	1.563
Constant	-.475	.282	.622		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q7_2 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), q3_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.116; Nagelkerke = 0.155

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 7.204$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.515

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 3,088

Table 37. Predicting agreement with the statement that ethnic diversity likely to increase too quickly in the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.144	.079	.866	.742	1.012
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	-.064	.213	.938	.618	1.424
Age: 35-44	-.246	.206	.782	.523	1.170
Age: 45-54	-.064	.197	.938	.638	1.380
Age: 55-64	-.243	.201	.784	.529	1.163
Age: 65-74	-.261	.216	.770	.505	1.175
Age: 75+	-.445	.228	.641	.410	1.002
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	.044	.290	1.045	.592	1.843
Ethnicity: Asian	.203	.269	1.225	.723	2.076
Ethnicity: Other	.364	.302	1.439	.796	2.601
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.124	.083	1.132	.962	1.332
Religion: Muslim	-.097	.390	.907	.423	1.947
Religion: Other religion	-.009	.259	.991	.597	1.645
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: 2 decile	.048	.155	1.049	.774	1.422
BAME: 3 decile	.130	.156	1.139	.839	1.546
BAME: 4 decile	.475	.155**	1.609	1.187	2.179
BAME: 5 decile	.496	.169**	1.643	1.179	2.289

BAME: 6 decile	.542	.180**	1.719	1.207	2.447
BAME: 7 decile	.553	.185**	1.738	1.209	2.498
BAME: 8 decile	.610	.200**	1.840	1.243	2.723
BAME: 9 decile	.493	.258	1.637	.987	2.713
BAME: 10 decile	1.242	.288***	3.461	1.970	6.081
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.632	.267*	1.882	1.116	3.174
Region: East of England	.550	.259*	1.734	1.043	2.882
Region: North East	.940	.288***	2.561	1.455	4.505
Region: North West	.621	.254**	1.861	1.131	3.063
Region: South East	.431	.251	1.539	.941	2.518
Region: South West	.087	.265	1.091	.649	1.834
Region: West Midlands	.430	.245	1.537	.952	2.483
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.237	.263	1.267	.757	2.122
Region: Wales	.495	.285	1.640	.939	2.865
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.111	.097	.895	.740	1.083
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.709	.131***	2.032	1.573	2.625
Education: No qualifications	.407	.097***	1.503	1.242	1.818
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.215	.268	.806	.476	1.364
Employment: Economically inactive	-.199	.108	.820	.663	1.013
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.099	.141	1.104	.838	1.454

Income: £20,000-£39,000	.179	.125	1.196	.936	1.530
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.350	.131**	1.419	1.098	1.833
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.920	.086***	.398	.336	.472
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.228	.095*	.796	.661	.959
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	.132	.152	1.141	.847	1.538
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.342	.160*	1.408	1.028	1.928
Constant	-1.360	.348	.257		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q6_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.087; Nagelkerke = 0.123

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 7.674$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.466

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 3,866

Table 38. Predicting agreement with the statement that the number of migrants is likely to increase too quickly in the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.230	.080**	.794	.680	.928
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.208	.250	1.231	.754	2.010
Age: 35-44	.279	.238	1.322	.830	2.106
Age: 45-54	.434	.230	1.544	.984	2.422
Age: 55-64	.311	.234	1.365	.864	2.158
Age: 65-74	.158	.246	1.171	.723	1.898
Age: 75+	-.155	.256	.856	.518	1.415
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Mixed	.258	.306	1.295	.711	2.358
Ethnicity: Asian	.093	.291	1.098	.620	1.943
Ethnicity: Other	.376	.300	1.456	.809	2.622
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.172	.084*	1.188	1.008	1.400
Religion: Other	-.067	.246	.935	.577	1.516
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: decile	.078	.143	1.081	.816	1.431
COB Non-UK: decile	-.037	.156	.963	.709	1.309
COB Non-UK: decile	.068	.162	1.070	.779	1.469
COB Non-UK: 5 decile	-.071	.164	.932	.676	1.284
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	.022	.180	1.022	.717	1.455

COB Non-UK: 7 decile	.227	.172	1.255	.897	1.758
COB Non-UK: 8 decile	.249	.195	1.282	.875	1.880
COB Non-UK: 9 decile	.003	.214	1.003	.659	1.527
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	.653	.395	1.922	.886	4.168
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.491	.344	1.634	.832	3.208
Region: East of England	.736	.346*	2.087	1.060	4.108
Region: North East	.557	.371	1.746	.843	3.613
Region: North West	.416	.344	1.516	.772	2.978
Region: South East	.581	.334	1.788	.929	3.440
Region: South West	.189	.347	1.208	.611	2.387
Region: West Midlands	.364	.348	1.439	.728	2.847
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	.209	.349	1.233	.622	2.443
Region: Wales	.230	.365	1.258	.615	2.575
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.207	.092*	.813	.679	.974
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.750	.131***	2.116	1.636	2.737
Education: No qualifications	.572	.098***	1.772	1.462	2.149
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	.155	.236	1.167	.735	1.854
Employment: Economically inactive	-.076	.108	.927	.750	1.147
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.369	.142**	1.446	1.095	1.910
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.188	.129	1.207	.938	1.554

Income: £40,000-£59,000	.315	.135*	1.370	1.051	1.784
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-1.123	.085***	.325	.275	.384
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.407	.095***	.666	.553	.801
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.437	.169**	.646	.464	.900
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.021	.163	1.022	.742	1.407
Constant	-1.271	.433	.281		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q37_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), COBNonUK_deciles, d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.122; Nagelkerke = 0.169

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 5.609$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.691

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 3,717

Table 39. Predicting agreement with the statement that religious diversity is likely to increase too quickly in the respondent's local community

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.301	.075***	.740	.639	.858
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	.097	.080	1.102	.943	1.288
Religion: Other religion	-.142	.189	.868	.599	1.258
Min. Rel.: decile 1 decile (ref.)					
Min. Rel.: 2 decile	.099	.159	1.105	.809	1.509
Min. Rel.: 3 decile	.300	.150*	1.350	1.006	1.811
Min. Rel.: 4 decile	.292	.164	1.339	.972	1.845
Min. Rel.: 5 decile	.052	.177	1.054	.745	1.490
Min. Rel.: 6 decile	.292	.176	1.339	.948	1.891
Min. Rel.: 7 decile	.258	.187	1.294	.898	1.865
Min. Rel.: 8 decile	.566	.180**	1.760	1.237	2.505
Min. Rel.: 9 decile	.886	.200***	2.426	1.640	3.588
Min. Rel.: 10 decile	.775	.227***	2.170	1.390	3.389
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	-.174	.212	.840	.554	1.273
Region: East of England	.231	.201	1.260	.850	1.869
Region: North East	-.033	.241	.967	.603	1.552
Region: North West	.162	.192	1.176	.807	1.713
Region: South East	-.038	.191	.963	.662	1.400
Region: South West	-.279	.211	.756	.500	1.143

Region: West Midlands	-.182	.187	.833	.577	1.203
Region: Yorkshire and Humber	-.343	.205	.710	.475	1.060
Region: Wales	-.347	.234	.707	.447	1.118
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.093	.095	.911	.757	1.097
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.443	.126***	1.557	1.216	1.994
Education: No qualifications	.251	.093**	1.285	1.071	1.542
Employment: Employed (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.057	.215	.945	.620	1.438
Employment: Economically inactive	-.293	.083***	.746	.634	.879
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.106	.135	1.112	.853	1.450
Income: £20,000-£39,000	-.016	.122	.984	.775	1.251
Income: £40,000-£59,000 3	.116	.128	1.123	.874	1.442
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.911	.083***	.402	.342	.473
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.221	.088*	.802	.675	.953
GE 2017 voting: Lib Dem	-.431	.171*	.650	.464	.909
GE 2017 voting: Other (caution)	.229	.156	1.257	.926	1.706
Constant	-.773	.239	.462		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q7_2 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), q3_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v5_4 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.076; Nagelkerke = 0.111

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 14.030$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.081

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less
n = 4,296

MARRIAGE

A. BIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 40. Marriage attitudes: Results of Pearson's chi-square tests

Scenario categories	Self-described ethnicity (4 or 5 categories)		
	Value	df	Sig
Arab	61.374	4	.000
Asian	4.020	3	.259
Black	67.321	3	.000
Chinese	49.965	4	.000
White	25.743	3	.000

Scenario categories	Self-described ethnicity (5 categories)		
	Value	df	Sig
Egyptian	42.146	4	.000
French	149.551	4	.000
Indian	23.410	4	.000
Iraqi	46.362	4	.000
Jamaican	81.069	4	.000
Nigerian	48.973	4	.000
Pakistani	29.944	4	.000
Polish	185.597	4	.000

Scenario categories	Self-described religion (7 categories)		
	Value	df	Sig.
Buddhist	413.063	6	.000
Christian	462.427	6	.000
Hindu	273.205	6	.000
Jewish	388.887	6	.000
Muslim	149.792	6	.000

Sikh	225.423	6	.000
No religion	662.650	6	.000

Self-described ethnicity (5 categories)			
Scenario categories	Value	df	Sig.
Buddhist 30	135.826	4	.000
Christian 25	273.570	4	.000
Hindu 27	69.453	4	.000
Jewish 26	295.696	4	.000
Muslim 28	41.843	4	.000
Sikh 29	48.319	4	.000
No religion 31	515.004	4	.000

Data source: Survation 2019

B. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 41. Predicting marriage uncomfortableness

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.216	.078**	.806	.691	.939
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.072	.223	1.074	.695	1.662
Age: 35-44	.309	.208	1.362	.906	2.047
Age: 45-54	.373	.203	1.451	.975	2.161
Age: 55-64	.301	.206	1.352	.902	2.026
Age: 65-74	.389	.215	1.475	.967	2.250
Age: 75+	.463	.223*	1.588	1.026	2.460
Ethnicity: British White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: British Asian	.081	.226	1.085	.697	1.688
Ethnicity: British Other	.462	.178**	1.587	1.119	2.251
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Anglican	.108	.104	1.115	.909	1.366
Religion: Baptist	.477	.214*	1.612	1.060	2.451
Religion: Catholic	.417	.133**	1.517	1.168	1.970
Religion: Methodist	.050	.199	1.052	.711	1.555
Religion: Other Christian	.203	.142	1.225	.928	1.616
Religion: Other religion	.353	.180*	1.424	1.000	2.027
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	-.242	.188	.785	.543	1.134

Region: East of England	.041	.161	1.042	.760	1.428
Region: North East	.051	.212	1.052	.695	1.594
Region: North West	-.046	.157	.955	.701	1.300
Region: South East	.091	.146	1.095	.823	1.458
Region: South West	.028	.170	1.028	.736	1.435
Region: West Midlands	.161	.162	1.175	.856	1.613
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber	.036	.169	1.036	.744	1.444
Region: Wales	.150	.197	1.162	.790	1.710
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.049	.125	1.162	.790	1.710
Education: Degree or above (ref.)					
Education: No qualifications	.783	.126***	2.188	1.709	2.801
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.405	.101***	1.499	1.231	1.825
Employment: Employment (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	-.212	.264	.809	.482	1.359
Employment: Economically Inactive	.322	.106**	1.380	1.122	1.698
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	-.164	.137	.848	.648	1.111
Income: £20,000-£39,000	-.119	.125	.888	.695	1.134
Income: £40,000-£59,000	-.128	.132	.880	.679	1.140
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.656	.086***	.519	.438	.614
General Election 2017: Conservative (ref.)					
General Election 2017: Labour	-.235	.092**	.791	.661	.946
General Election 2017: Liberal Democrat	-.627	.196***	.534	.364	.785
General Election 2017: Other (caution)	.006	.159	1.006	.737	1.373

Constant	-2.560	.253	.077
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Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q_marriage_10decile (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_1 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_9 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.036; Nagelkerke = 0.073 Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 9.127$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.332

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 8,140

FRIENDSHIP

A. BIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 42. Friendship diversity by ethnicity

How many friends are the same ethnicity as you?				
%				
All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them
23.9	54.3	11.6	7.6	2.5

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q2

Total unweighted n=11,288

Data weighted with variable: weights

Table 43. Friendship diversity by nationality

How many of your friends are of British nationality?				
%				
All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them
30.9	53.7	10.4	4.4	0.5

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q33

Total unweighted n=11,444

Data weighted with variable: weights

Table 44. Friendship diversity by religion

How many of your friends are the same religion as you?				
%				
All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them
12.6	44.0	20.0	19.8	3.7

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q17

Total unweighted n=4,416

Data weighted with variable: weights

B. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 45. Predicting ethnically diverse friendships (having friends only from the same ethnic background)

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.135	.057*	.874	.781	.978
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34 1	.072	.142	1.075	.814	1.420
Age: 35-44 2	-.064	.138	.938	.716	1.229
Age: 45-54 3	.009	.134	1.009	.777	1.312
Age: 55-64 4	-.064	.136	.938	.718	1.225
Age: 65-74 5	-.104	.146	.901	.677	1.201
Age: 75+ 6	.032	.154	1.032	.763	1.397
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Asian 1	-.098	.226	.906	.582	1.413
Ethnicity: Other 2	-.279	.222	.757	.489	1.170
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian 1	.007	.060	1.007	.895	1.133
Religion: Muslim 2	.165	.259	1.180	.709	1.962
Religion: Other 3	-.038	.172	.962	.687	1.348
Local ethnic diversity: Agreed (ref. Disagree)	-.526	.059***	.591	.526	.664
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: 2 decile 1	-.260	.117	.771	.613	.970
BAME: 3 decile 2	-.211	.118	.810	.643	1.020
BAME: 4 decile 3	-.017	.117	.983	.782	1.236

BAME: 5 decile 4	-.211	.126	.810	.632	1.036
BAME: 6 decile 5	-.221	.135	.802	.616	1.045
BAME: 7 decile 6	-.407	.134**	.665	.511	.866
BAME: 8 decile 7	-.412	.141**	.662	.502	.873
BAME: 9 decile 8	-.495	.166**	.609	.440	.844
BAME: 10 decile 9	-.772	.187***	.462	.320	.667
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands 1	.045	.162	1.046	.761	1.439
Region: East of England 2	-.020	.159	.980	.717	1.340
Region: North East 3	.370	.185	1.448	1.008	2.080
Region: North West 4	.431	.149**	1.539	1.150	2.060
Region: South East 5	-.156	.153	.855	.634	1.154
Region: South West 6	.018	.162	1.018	.742	1.398
Region: West Midlands 7	.003	.148	1.003	.750	1.342
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber 8	.255	.160	1.290	.942	1.767
Region: Wales 9	.202	.179	1.224	.861	1.740
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	-.029	.074	.972	.840	1.124
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree 1	.572	.095***	1.772	1.470	2.134
Education: No qualifications 2	.259	.069***	1.296	1.132	1.484
Employment: Employment (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment 1	.054	.174	1.055	.751	1.484
Employment: Economically Inactive 2	.313	.076***	1.367	1.178	1.587
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					

Income: Less than £20,000 1	.416	.103***	1.516	1.239	1.856
Income: £20,000-£39,000 2	.236	.095**	1.266	1.051	1.524
Income: £40,000-£59,000 3	.166	.100	1.181	.972	1.435
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.246	.060***	.782	.695	.880
General Election 2017 vote: Conservative (ref.)					
General Election 2017 vote: Labour 1	-.132	.067	.877	.768	1.000
General Election 2017 vote: Liberal Democrat 2	-.190	.115	.827	.661	1.035
General Election 2017 vote: Other 3 (Caution)	.076	.123	1.079	.848	1.373
Constant	-.915	.229	.400		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q2_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), q3_2 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), ru_2(recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded),

Data weighted with variable: weights

R2 tests: Cox and Snell = 0.068; Nagelkerke = 0.099

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 13.391$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.099

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 7,556

Table 46. Predicting nationally diverse friendships (having friends only from the same British background)

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.069	.050	.933	.845	1.030
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	-.161	.115	.851	.679	1.067
Age: 35-44	-.267	.112*	.765	.614	.954
Age: 45-54	-.115	.109	.891	.720	1.103
Age: 55-64	-.180	.112	.836	.671	1.040
Age: 65-74	-.122	.120	.885	.699	1.121
Age: 75+	-.173	.129	.841	.653	1.083
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: Asian	.175	.147	1.192	.894	1.588
Ethnicity: Black	-.398	.185*	.672	.467	.966
Ethnicity: Other	-.596	.185***	.551	.384	.792
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.146	.054**	.864	.777	.960
Religion: Muslim	.362	.175*	1.436	1.018	2.025
Religion: Other	-.130	.140	.878	.667	1.156
Local nationality diversity: Agree (ref. Disagree)	-.487	.051***	.614	.556	.679
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.225	.122	1.253	.986	1.592
Region: East of England	.373	.112***	1.452	1.166	1.808
Region: North East	.915	.139***	2.497	1.902	3.278

Region: North West	.633	.108***	1.884	1.525	2.328
Region: South East	.195	.106	1.215	.988	1.494
Region: South West	.349	.115**	1.418	1.132	1.777
Region: West Midlands	.411	.114***	1.508	1.207	1.884
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber	.586	.115***	1.796	1.435	2.249
Region: Wales	.592	.132***	1.808	1.395	2.343
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.539	.084***	1.713	1.453	2.021
Education: No qualifications	.271	.061***	1.312	1.164	1.478
Employment: Employment (ref.)					
Employment: Unemployment	.362	.138**	1.436	1.096	1.881
Employment: Economically Inactive	.247	.067***	1.280	1.122	1.460
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.210	.088*	1.234	1.038	1.467
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.114	.081	1.121	.957	1.313
Income: £40,000-£59,000	-.025	.086	.975	.823	1.155
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.356	.051***	.700	.634	.774
Constant	-.908	.154	.403		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q33_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_6 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), q34_2 (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.062; Nagelkerke = 0.087

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 9.289$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.318

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 8,412

Table 47. Predicting religiously diverse friendships (having friends only from the same religious background)

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.334	.128**	.716	.558	.920
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.047	.276	1.049	.610	1.803
Age: 35-44	-.266	.277	.766	.445	1.320
Age: 45-54	-.614	.294*	.541	.304	.964
Age: 55-64	-1.104	.302***	.332	.184	.599
Age: 65-74	-1.206	.317***	.299	.161	.557
Age: 75+	-1.143	.323***	.319	.169	.600
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)	-.583	.259*	.558	.336	.928
Religion: Christian (ref.)					
Religion: Muslim	.080	.308	1.083	.593	1.979
Religion: Other	-.189	.285	.827	.473	1.447
Religious participation: Not at all (ref.)					
Religious participation: At least once a day	.196	.253	1.217	.742	1.997
Religious participation: At least once a week	-1.037	.211***	.355	.234	.537
Religious participation: At least once a month	-.297	.224	.743	.480	1.152
Religious participation: Less often	-.642	.174***	.526	.374	.740
Religious participation: Only on festivals	-.748	.221***	.474	.307	.730
Local religious diversity: Agree (ref. Disagree)	-.474	.134***	.622	.479	.809
Min. Rel: 1st decile (ref.)					
Min. Rel: 2nd decile	.307	.291	1.359	.768	2.407

Min. Rel: 3rd decile	-.072	.282	.930	.535	1.618
Min. Rel: 4th decile	.856	.290**	2.353	1.333	4.156
Min. Rel: 5th decile	-.224	.325	.800	.423	1.512
Min. Rel: 6th decile	.073	.306	1.076	.591	1.958
Min. Rel: 7th decile	-.091	.340	.913	.469	1.778
Min. Rel: 8th decile	.037	.310	1.037	.565	1.903
Min. Rel: 9th decile	.605	.316	1.832	.987	3.401
Min. Rel: 10th decile	.271	.347	1.311	.664	2.588
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	-.093	.297	.912	.509	1.631
Region: East of England	.015	.286	1.015	.579	1.777
Region: North East	-.123	.370	.884	.428	1.824
Region: North West	.102	.254	1.107	.674	1.820
Region: South East	.092	.262	1.096	.656	1.833
Region: South West	-.078	.305	.925	.509	1.681
Region: West Midlands	-.297	.271	.743	.437	1.264
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber	-.082	.289	.921	.523	1.623
Region: Wales	-.731	.421	.481	.211	1.097
Urban-Rural classification: Rural (ref. Urban)	.080	.172	1.083	.773	1.517
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.748	.215***	2.113	1.387	3.218
Education: No qualifications	.385	.157*	1.469	1.081	1.997
Employment: Not Employment (ref. Employment)	.161	.175	1.174	.833	1.655
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					

Income: Less than £20,000	.079	.224	1.083	.698	1.680
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.088	.205	1.092	.730	1.633
Income: £40,000-£59,000	-.180	.223	.835	.539	1.293
EU Referendum 2016 vote: Remain (ref. Leave)	-.352	.135**	.703	.540	.916
GE 2017 voting: Conservative (ref.)					
GE 2017 voting: Labour	-.015	.154	.986	.728	1.334
GE 2017 voting: Liberal Democrat	-.090	.286	.914	.522	1.601
GE 2017 voting: Other (Caution)	.167	.265	1.181	.702	1.987
Constant	-.600	.472	.549		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q17_3 (recoded), d3, d4_2 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), d19, q18_2 (recoded), d2_2b (recoded), ru_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_2 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded), v19_2 (recoded), v5_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R2 tests: Cox and Snell = 0.068; Nagelkerke = 0.117

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 13.199$ df = 8, Sig. = 0.105

* = significant at the 5% level or less, ** = significant at the 1% or less, *** = significant at the 0.1% or less

n = 2,368

WORKPLACE

A. BIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 48. Workplace diversity by ethnicity

At work, how many of your colleagues are the same ethnicity as you?				
%				
All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them
18.5	46.5	16.1	13.7	5.2

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q1

Total unweighted n=5,406

Data weighted with variable: weights

Table 49. Workplace diversity by ethnicity and ethnic group (indicative only)

At work, how many of your colleagues are the same ethnicity as you?						
%						
	All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them	Total
Asian	8.3	13.4	12.6	45.9	19.7	100
Black	*	*	18.9	56.7	*	100
Mixed	*	*	*	37.7	35.7	100
Other	*	*	*	*	*	100
White	21.3	53.8	16.6	6.4	1.9	100

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q1, d5_6(recoded)

Total unweighted n=5,371

Data weighted with variable: weights

*Unweighted n<30

Table 50. Workplace diversity by nationality

At work, how many of your colleagues are of British nationality?				
%				
All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them
24.1	53.2	16.6	5.7	0.5

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q32

Total unweighted n=5,371

Data weighted with variable: weights

Table 51. Workplace diversity by nationality and birthplace (indicative only)

At work, how many of your colleagues are of British nationality?						
%						
	All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them	Total
In the UK	24.9	53.5	15.9	5.3	*	100
Outside the UK	12.7	48.9	25.2	10.2	*	100

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q32, cob2 (recoded)

Total unweighted n=5,564

Data weighted with variable: weights

*Unweighted n<30

Table 52. Workplace diversity by nationality and British ethnicity (indicative only)

At work, how many of your colleagues are of British nationality?						
%						
	All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them	Total
British	25.3	54.8	15.1	4.5	*	100
Other	*	45.4	27.9	13.9	*	100

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q32, d5a_2 (recoded)

Total unweighted n=5,520

Data weighted with variable: weights

*Unweighted n<30

Table 53. Workplace diversity by religion

At work, how many of your colleagues are the same religion as you?				
%				
All of them	Most of the them	About half of them	A few of them	None of them
10.6	30.8	19.4	30.5	8.7

Data source: Survation 2019

Variable: q16

N=1,623

Data weighted with variable: weights

**Table 54. Workplace diversity by ethnicity, nationality and religion:
Results of Pearson's chi-square tests**

Workplace diversity by ethnicity and ethnic group

Value	df	Sig
2156.341 ^a	12	.000

^a 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5

Workplace diversity by nationality and British ethnicity

Value	df	Sig
719.090 ^b	4	.000

^b 1 cell (10%) has expected count less than 5

Workplace diversity by religion and religion group

Value	df	Sig.
179.988 ^c	16	.000

^c 1 cell (10%) has expected count less than 5

Data source: Survation 2019
Variables: q1, q33, q16, d5_6 (recoded), d5_4 (recoded), d5a_2 (recoded)
Data weighted with variable: weights

B. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS

Table 55. Predicting workplace diversity by ethnicity: likelihood of having colleagues only from the same ethnic group

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)		
				Lower	Upper	
Age: 18-24 (ref.)						
Age: 25-34	-.014	.129	.986	.766	1.270	
Age: 35-44	-.194	.129	.823	.640	1.060	
Age: 45-54	-.093	.126	.911	.711	1.167	
Age: 55-64	-.210	.143	.810	.613	1.072	
Age: 65+	.404	.211	1.497	.991	2.262	
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)						
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)						
BAME: 2 decile	-.128	.148	.880	.659	1.175	
BAME: 3 decile	-.056	.146	.946	.710	1.259	
BAME: 4 decile	-.332	.154	.718	.531	.970	
BAME: 5 decile	-.721	.156***	.486	.359	.660	
BAME: 6 decile	-.485	.161**	.616	.449	.845	
BAME: 7 decile	-.842	.156***	.431	.317	.585	
BAME: 8 decile	-.812	.163***	.444	.323	.611	
BAME: 9 decile	-1.228	.204***	.293	.196	.436	
BAME: 10 decile	-1.107	.210***	.331	.219	.499	
Region: London (ref.)						
Region: East Midlands	-.186	.207	.830	.553	1.246	

Region: East of England	-.076	.198	.926	.629	1.365
Region: North East	-.232	.236	.793	.499	1.260
Region: North West	.152	.185	1.165	.810	1.674
Region: South East	-.023	.187	.977	.677	1.410
Region: South West	.249	.200	1.283	.867	1.899
Region: West Midlands	.244	.175	1.276	.905	1.799
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber	-.031	.200	.970	.655	1.435
Region: Wales	.202	.216	1.223	.801	1.868
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.317	.136*	1.373	1.052	1.791
Education: No qualifications	.315	.089***	1.370	1.151	1.631
Employment status: Part-time (ref. Full-time)	.146	.084	1.158	.981	1.366
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.357	.127**	1.428	1.113	1.833
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.162	.111	1.176	.946	1.460
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.113	.115	1.119	.893	1.402
Constant	-1.184	.235	.306		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q1_3 (recoded), d4_6 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d8_4 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.065; Nagelkerke = 0.105

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 4.544$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.805

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 5,326

Table 56. Predicting workplace diversity by nationality: likelihood of having only British colleagues

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	.007	.071	1.007	.876	1.157
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	-.020	.114	.980	.784	1.225
Age: 35-44	-.175	.116	.840	.669	1.053
Age: 45-54	-.022	.115	.978	.781	1.225
Age: 55-64	.190	.129	1.210	.940	1.556
Age: 65 and over	.659	.199***	1.933	1.308	2.856
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: British Asian	.455	.151**	1.576	1.173	2.119
Ethnicity: British Other	-.191	.143	.826	.625	1.094
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.077	.077	.926	.797	1.075
Religion: Muslim	.527	.178**	1.694	1.196	2.401
Religion: Other	.175	.157	1.191	.875	1.621
COB Non-UK: 1 decile (ref.)					
COB Non-UK: 2 decile	.061	.141	1.063	.806	1.401
COB Non-UK: 3 decile	-.073	.151	.930	.691	1.250
COB Non-UK: 4 decile	-.105	.158	.900	.660	1.228
COB Non-UK: 5 decile	-.150	.157	.861	.632	1.172
COB Non-UK: 6 decile	-.138	.154	.871	.645	1.178
COB Non-UK: 7 decile	-.551	.151***	.576	.428	.775

COB Non-UK: 8 decile	-.321	.156	.725	.534	.985
COB Non-UK: 9 decile	-.725	.168***	.484	.348	.673
COB Non-UK: 10 decile	-.795	.225***	.452	.291	.701
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	.337	.196	1.400	.953	2.058
Region: East of England	.395	.197*	1.485	1.009	2.186
Region: North East	.519	.233*	1.681	1.065	2.651
Region: North West	.534	.193**	1.706	1.168	2.491
Region: South East	.357	.185	1.429	.994	2.055
Region: South West	.435	.203*	1.545	1.037	2.302
Region: West Midlands	.322	.190	1.380	.952	2.001
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber	.208	.203	1.231	.827	1.831
Region: Wales	.546	.220*	1.727	1.121	2.661
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.143	.127	1.154	.900	1.479
Education: No qualifications	.312	.082***	1.366	1.163	1.603
Occupation: High managerial (ref.)					
Occupation: Intermediate managerial	-.382	.111***	.682	.549	.848
Occupation: Public sector	-.384	.130**	.681	.528	.878
Occupation: Supervisor, MD, owner	-.125	.115	.883	.704	1.106
Occupation: Skilled worker	-.170	.135	.844	.648	1.098
Occupation: Semi-skilled worker	-.508	.140***	.602	.457	.793
Occupation: Unskilled worker	-.482	.181**	.617	.433	.881
Employment status: Part-time (ref. Full-time)	.116	.082	1.123	.956	1.319

Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)

Income: Less than £20,000	.193	.117	1.213	.965	1.525
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.056	.099	1.058	.871	1.284
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.037	.101	1.038	.851	1.266
Constant	-1.275	.246	.280		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q32_3 (recoded), d3, d4_6 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), COBNonUK_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d12_2 (recoded), d8_4 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.047; Nagelkerke = 0.071

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 15.208$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.055

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 5,290

Table 57. Predicting workplace diversity by religion: likelihood of having colleagues only from the same religious group

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	-.438	.175*	.645	.458	.909
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	-.428	.247	.652	.402	1.057
Age: 35-44	-.779	.259**	.459	.276	.762
Age: 45 and over	-1.234	.250***	.291	.178	.475
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: British Asian	-.514	.274	.598	.350	1.023
Ethnicity: British Other	-2.840	.641***	.058	.017	.205
Religion: Other religion (ref. Christian)	.296	.233	1.344	.852	2.122
Min. Rel: 1 decile (ref.)					
Min. Rel: 2 decile	-.588	.474	.556	.220	1.406
Min. Rel: 3 decile (ref.)	-1.077	.423*	.341	.149	.781
Min. Rel: 4 decile (ref.)	-.628	.439	.534	.226	1.262
Min. Rel: 5 decile (ref.)	-.680	.438	.507	.215	1.195
Min. Rel: 6 decile (ref.)	.105	.377	1.111	.531	2.327
Min. Rel: 7 decile (ref.)	-.521	.399	.594	.272	1.298
Min. Rel: 8 decile (ref.)	-.259	.356	.772	.384	1.551
Min. Rel: 9 decile (ref.)	-.490	.381	.613	.290	1.292
Min. Rel: 10 decile (ref.)	-.289	.390	.749	.349	1.609
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: East Midlands	1.303	.349***	3.679	1.858	7.284

Region: East of England	.742	.364*	2.101	1.029	4.290
Region: North East	-.336	.610	.714	.216	2.361
Region: North West	.802	.331*	2.231	1.165	4.272
Region: South East	.781	.348*	2.184	1.105	4.316
Region: South West	1.020	.410*	2.774	1.243	6.193
Region: West Midlands	.165	.341	1.180	.605	2.301
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber	.641	.372	1.898	.916	3.934
Region: Wales	.409	.544	1.506	.519	4.370
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.098	.321	1.103	.588	2.068
Education: No qualifications	.177	.194	1.194	.816	1.747
Occupation: High managerial (ref.)					
Occupation: Intermediate managerial	-1.147	.247***	.318	.196	.516
Occupation: Public sector	-1.106	.333***	.331	.172	.635
Occupation: Supervisor, MD, owner	-.579	.255*	.560	.340	.924
Occupation: Skilled worker	-.388	.294	.678	.381	1.207
Occupation: Semi-skilled worker	-.321	.324	.726	.384	1.370
Occupation: Unskilled worker	-1.661	.746*	.190	.044	.819
Employment status: Part-time (ref. Full-time)	.050	.215	1.052	.689	1.604
Constant	-.737	.464	.478		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q16_3 (recoded), d3, d4_5 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_3 (recoded), MinRel_deciles (recoded), d2_2 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d12_2 (recoded), d8_4 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.088; Nagelkerke = 0.178

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 9.312$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.317

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 1,623

Table 58. Predicting being a “workplace solo” by ethnicity

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	.429	.145**	1.536	1.155	2.043
Age: 18-24 (ref.)					
Age: 25-34	.581	.226*	1.787	1.148	2.782
Age: 35-44	.815	.229***	2.260	1.442	3.542
Age: 45-54	.079	.257	1.082	.654	1.789
Age: 55-64	.728	.292*	2.071	1.169	3.669
Age: 65+	.297	.600	1.346	.415	4.366
Ethnicity: White (ref.)					
Ethnicity: British Asian	2.927	.218***	18.663	12.176	28.607
Ethnicity: British Other	2.680	.188***	14.583	10.080	21.097
Religion: No religion (ref.)					
Religion: Christian	-.351	.171*	.704	.503	.985
Religion: Muslim	-.676	.236**	.508	.320	.807
Religion: Other religion	-.322	.252	.725	.442	1.187
BAME: 1 decile (ref.)					
BAME: 2 decile	.055	.464	1.056	.425	2.624
BAME: 3 decile	-.535	.520	.586	.211	1.624
BAME: 4 decile	.262	.417	1.299	.573	2.944
BAME: 5 decile	.385	.403	1.469	.668	3.234
BAME: 6 decile	-.160	.422	.852	.373	1.947
BAME: 7 decile	.361	.377	1.434	.685	3.004

BAME: 8 decile	.363	.360	1.437	.709	2.912
BAME: 9 decile	.235	.382	1.265	.598	2.675
BAME: 10 decile	.018	.392	1.018	.473	2.193
Region: London (ref.)					
Region: North	-.650	.259*	.522	.314	.868
Region: Midlands	-.545	.215*	.580	.381	.884
Region: South	-.228	.254	.796	.484	1.311
Education: Degree (ref.)					
Education: Qualifications other than degree	.596	.245*	1.814	1.123	2.933
Education: No qualifications	.157	.167	1.170	.843	1.624
Occupation: High managerial (ref.)					
Occupation: Intermediate managerial	.738	.245**	2.092	1.295	3.379
Occupation: Public sector	1.175	.272***	3.239	1.900	5.521
Occupation: Supervisor, MD, owner	.618	.277*	1.855	1.077	3.194
Occupation: Skilled worker	.505	.332	1.658	.865	3.176
Occupation: Semi-skilled worker	1.276	.308***	3.581	1.959	6.547
Occupation: Unskilled worker	1.623	.386***	5.067	2.380	10.788
Employment status: Part-time (ref. Full-time)	-.185	.177	.831	.587	1.176
Income: £60,000 and over (ref.)					
Income: Less than £20,000	.220	.236	1.246	.785	1.978
Income: £20,000-£39,000	.099	.197	1.104	.750	1.626
Income: £40,000-£59,000	.050	.204	1.052	.705	1.569
Constant	-5.379	.510	.005		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q1_4 (recoded), d3, d4_6 (recoded), d5_7 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), BAME:_deciles (recoded), d2_3 (recoded), quals3cats (recoded), d12_2 (recoded), d8_4 (recoded), d15_3 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.089; Nagelkerke = 0.259

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 4.289$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.830

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 4,770

[NB. “Predicting being a “workplace solo” by nationality has been excluded from the analysis due to insufficient data and low cells counts.]

Table 59. Predicting being a “workplace solo” by religion

	β	S.E.	Exp(β)	95% C.I. for Exp (β)	
				Lower	Upper
Sex/Gender: Female (ref. Male)	.448	.179*	1.565	1.102	2.224
Age: 40 and over (ref. Under 40)	.505	.184**	1.657	1.154	2.378
Ethnicity: BAME: (ref. White)	-.012	.218	.988	.645	1.515
Religion: Christian (ref.)					
Religion: Muslim	.991	.276***	2.695	1.569	4.629
Religion: Other religion	1.442	.218***	4.230	2.758	6.488
Region: Other (ref. London)	-.458	.192*	.633	.434	.921
Education: Below degree (ref. Degree or above)	-.184	.188	.832	.576	1.203
Income: £40,000 and over (ref. Under £40,000)	-.107	.190	.899	.620	1.303
Constant	-2.941	.301	.053		

Data source: Survation 2019

Variables used: q16_4 (recoded), d3, d4_7 (recoded), d5_5 (recoded), d18a_4 (recoded), d2_4 (recoded), quals2cats (recoded), d15_5 (recoded)

Data weighted with variable: weights

R² tests: Cox and Snell = 0.037; Nagelkerke = 0.085

Hosmer and Lemeshow: $\chi^2 = 5.141$, df = 8, Sig. = 0.742

* = significant at 5% level or less, ** = significant at 1% level or less, *** = significant at 0.1% level or less

n = 1,610

APPENDIX C:

FIGURES

Fig. 1 Ethnic diversity is good for British society (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 2 Ethnic diversity is good for my local community (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 3 Migrants are good for British society (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 4 Migrants are good for my local community (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 5 Religious diversity is good for British society (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 6 Religious diversity is good for my local community (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 7 Compared to London, likelihood of negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society




Fig. 8 Compared to London, likelihood of negative attitudes towards migrants in British society




Fig. 9 Compared to London, likelihood of negative attitudes towards migrants in local communities




Fig. 10 Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 11 Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 12 The no. of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 13 The no. of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 14 Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)




Fig. 15 Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years (% agree or disagree)





Fig. 16 Compared to London, likelihood of agreeing that the number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years



3

Fig. 17 Compared to 18 to 24 year olds, likelihood of agreeing that ethnic diversity has increased too quickly in local communities




Fig. 18 Compared to London, likelihood of negative attitudes towards migrants in local communities




Fig. 19 A Black person




(Question asked to non-Black respondents)

Fig. 20 An Asian person




(Question asked to non-Asian respondents)

Fig. 21 A Pakistani person



(Question asked to non-Pakistani respondents)


Fig. 22 A Muslim person



(Question asked to non-Muslim respondents)

The heatmaps above report attitudes at the local authority level towards a close relative marrying someone from a different ethnic, national or religious background.

Green tones indicate positive attitudes, red tones indicate negative attitudes and tones in between represent weaker sentiment or ambivalence.



0 = No respondents comfortable
(0% comfortable)

100 = All respondents comfortable
(100% comfortable)

Data source: Survation 2019

Fig. 23. Targets of “marriage uncomfortableness” by ethnicity

		Targets of marriage uncomfortableness ↓ How would you feel if one of close relatives were to marry...? ↓				
		an Arab person	an Asian person	a Black person	a Chinese person	a White person
Sources of marriage ↓ uncomfortableness ↓	Asian					
	Black					
	Mixed					
	Other					
	White					

Data source: Survation 2019

Findings reported where a majority of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) from a particular ethnic group were “uncomfortable” (red squares), or where between 25% and 50% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) were “uncomfortable” (orange squares), or where between 0% and 24% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) “uncomfortable” (green squares), and where cell counts in all cases for “uncomfortable” responses were 30 or more. All other findings (e.g. cell counts under 30) were identified as being inconclusive due to insufficient data (grey squares).

Fig. 24. Targets of “marriage uncomfortableness” by nationality and ethnicity

		Targets of marriage uncomfortableness							
		↓ How would you feel if one of close relatives were to marry a person from...? ↓							
		Egypt	France	India	Iraq	Jamaica	Nigeria	Pakistan	Poland
Sources of marriage uncomfortableness ↓	Asian								
	Black								
	Mixed								
	Other								
	White								

Data source: Survation 2019

Findings reported where a majority of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) from a particular ethnic group were “uncomfortable” (red squares), or where between 25% and 50% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) were “uncomfortable” (orange squares), or where between 0% and 24% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) “uncomfortable” (green squares), and where cell counts in all cases for “uncomfortable” responses were 30 or more. All other findings (e.g. cell counts under 30) were identified as being inconclusive due to insufficient data (grey squares).

Fig. 25. Targets and sources of marriage uncomfortableness by religion

		Targets of marriage uncomfortableness						
		↓ How would you feel if a close relative were to marry ↓ a person belonging to the following religions...?						
		a Buddhist person	a Christian person	a Hindu person	a Jewish person	a Muslim person	a Sikh person	a No religion person
↓ Sources of marriage uncomfortableness ↓	Buddhist							
	Christian							
	Hindu							
	Jewish							
	Muslim							
	Sikh							
	Other religion							
	No religion							

Data source: Survation 2019

Findings reported where a majority of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) from a particular ethnic group were “uncomfortable” (red squares), or where between 25% and 50% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) were “uncomfortable” (orange squares), or where between 0% and 24% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) “uncomfortable” (green squares), and where cell counts in all cases for “uncomfortable” responses were 30 or more. All other findings (e.g. cell counts under 30) were identified as being inconclusive due to insufficient data (grey squares).

Fig. 26. Targets and sources of marriage uncomfortableness by religion and ethnicity

		Targets of marriage uncomfortableness ↓ How would you feel if a close relative were to marry ↓ a person belonging to the following religions...?						
		a Buddhist person	a Christian person	a Hindu person	a Jewish person	a Muslim person	a Sikh person	a No religion person
Sources of marriage uncomfortableness ↓	Asian							
	Black							
	Mixed							
	Other							
	White							

Data source: Survation 2019

Findings reported where a majority of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) from a particular ethnic group were “uncomfortable” (red squares), or where between 25% and 50% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) were “uncomfortable” (orange squares), or where between 0% and 24% of responses (excluding “don’t know” responses) “uncomfortable” (green squares), and where cell counts in all cases for “uncomfortable” responses were 30 or more. All other findings (e.g. cell counts under 30) were identified as being inconclusive due to insufficient data (grey squares).

The pie-charts below report experiences of friendship diversity. Respondents were asked how many of their friends are from the same ethnic, British national and religious background. Those who answered “most of them”, “about half of them”, “a few of them” and “none of them” were deemed to have diverse friendships (i.e. friends from backgrounds different to the respondent’s own). Those who answered “all of them” were deemed to have non-diverse friendships.

Fig. 27 Friendship diversity by ethnicity (% diverse and non-diverse)




Fig. 28 Friendship diversity by (British) nationality (% diverse and non-diverse)




Fig. 29 Friendship diversity by religion (% diverse and non-diverse)




Fig. 30 Compared to those with degrees, likelihood of having friends from same ethnic group




Fig. 31 Compared to those who are employed, likelihood of having friends only from same ethnic background




Fig. 32 Compared to highest earners, likelihood of having friends from same ethnic group




Fig. 33 Compared to London, the likelihood of having on British friends





Fig. 34 Compared to those who are employed, likelihood of having only British friends



The pie-charts below report experiences of workplace diversity. Respondents were asked how many of their colleagues are from the same ethnic, British national and religious background. Those who answered “most of them”, “about half of them” and “a few of them” were deemed to work in a diverse setting. Those who answered “all of them” and “none of them” were deemed to work in a non-diverse setting (i.e. a place where all the workers were from the same background or the respondent was the only person from their background).¹

Fig. 35 Workplace diversity by ethnicity (% diverse and non-diverse)




Fig. 36 Workplace diversity by (British) nationality (% diverse and non-diverse)






Fig. 37 Workplace diversity by religion (% diverse and non-diverse)




¹ Our formulation for workplace diversity and friendship diversity differs slightly in that we consider “workplace solos” to be working in non-diverse settings.

Fig 38. Compared to London, likelihood of having only British colleagues



MARRIAGE HEATMAPS

The heatmaps below report attitudes at the local authority level towards a close relative marrying someone from a different ethnic, national or religious background. Green tones indicate positive attitudes, red tones indicate negative attitudes and tones in between represent weaker sentiment or ambivalence.



0 = No respondents
comfortable
(0% comfortable)

100 = All respondents
comfortable
(100% comfortable)

Ethnic groups

Fig. A1 An Arab person




Fig. A2 An Asian person




Fig A3 An Black person



Fig. A4 A Chinese person




Fig. A5 European person




Fig A6 A White person



National groups

Fig. A7 An Egyptian person




Fig. A8 A French person



Fig. A9 An Indian person




Fig. A10 An Iraqi person





Fig. A11 A Jamaican person



Fig. A12 A Nigerian person



National groups (continued)

Fig. A13 A Pakistani person






Fig. A14 A Polish person



Religion groups

Fig. A15 An Atheist person




Fig. A16 A Buddhist person



Fig. A17 A Christian person




Fig. A18 A Hindu person




Fig. A19 A Jewish person







Fig. A20 A Muslim person



Religion groups (continued)

Fig. A21 A Sikh person



APPENDIX D:

NOTES ON METHODS

SAMPLE DESIGN

(Notes courtesy of Survation)

Fieldwork dates

29 March to 5 April 2019

Data collection method

The survey was conducted via an online panel. Invitations to complete surveys were sent out to members of the panel. Differential response rates from different demographic groups were taken into account.

Population

All residents aged 18+ living in England and Wales

SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

(A full version of the questionnaire is available on request)

DIVERSITY

Our survey questions

All respondents

Ethnic diversity is good for British society

Migrants are good for British society

Religious diversity is good for British society

Respondents who agreed that their local community was ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse (established in three separate questions)

Ethnic diversity is good for my local community

Migrants are good for my local community

Religious diversity is good for my local community

Respondents who disagreed that their local community is diverse

Ethnic diversity would be good for my local community

Migrants would be good for my local community

Religious diversity would be good for my local community

Available responses

Strongly agree – Somewhat agree – Neither agree nor disagree – Somewhat disagree – Strongly disagree – Don't know

CHANGE

Our survey questions

All respondents

Ethnic diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

The number of migrants in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Religious diversity in Britain has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Respondents who agreed that their local community was ethnically, nationally or religiously diverse (established in three separate questions)

Ethnic diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

The number of migrants in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Religious diversity in my local community has increased too quickly in the past 10 years

Respondents who disagreed that their local community is diverse

Ethnic diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

The number of migrants in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

Religious diversity in my local community is likely to increase too quickly in the next 10 years

Available responses

Strongly agree – Somewhat agree – Neither agree nor disagree – Somewhat disagree – Strongly disagree – Don't know

MARRIAGE

Our survey question

How would you feel if one of your close relatives were to marry...

Available responses

By ethnicity

An Arab person?

An Asian person?

A Black person?

A Chinese person?

A European person?

A White person?

By nationality

A person from Egypt?

A person from France?

A person from India?

A person from Iraq?

A person from Jamaica?

A person from Nigeria?

A person from Pakistan?

A person from Poland?

By religion

A Buddhist person?

A Christian person?

A Hindu person?

A Jewish person?

Muslim person?

Sikh person

No religion person?

FRIENDSHIP

Our survey questions

How many of your friends are the same ethnicity as you?

How many of your friends are of British nationality?

How many of your friends are of the same religion as you?

Available responses

All of them – Most of them – About half of them – A few of them – None of them

WORKPLACE

Our survey questions

At work, how many of your colleagues are the same ethnicity as you?

At work, how many of your colleagues are of British nationality?

At work, how many colleagues are the same religion as you?

Available responses

All of them – Most of them – About half of them – A few of them – None of them

ANALYSIS

Bivariate analysis

Various variables were explored with frequency and crosstabulation analysis. Where appropriate to do so, variables were weighted (with variable: weights).

Given the sensitive nature of the chosen topics, a conservative approach to the data was taken. Findings are only reported if the relevant cells counts were 30 or more. If less than 30, categories were merged until a single merged category returned a cell count of 30 or more. This was particularly relevant for ethnic and religion groups where minority populations were only sampled in small numbers. (Hence the use of categories such as White and BAME or No religion, Christian, Muslim and Other.)

Multivariate analysis

Pearsons's chi-square test was used to determine statistically significant associations between variables.

Binary logistic regression modelling was used to determine the predictive effects of chosen independent variables (e.g. sex/gender, age, ethnicity and so on) on various dependent variables (e.g. attitudes towards ethnic diversity in British society).

The analysis was completed using SPSS. All SPSS codes for each of the models (including the names of merged and recoded variables) is available on request.

Multilevel Regression Poststratification

Sampling

MRP analysis of data with responses from between 838 respondents (responses asking about a close relative marrying someone White, which was asked only of non-White respondents) to 9,480 respondents (responses asking about a close relative marrying someone French, which was asked only of non-French respondents). The number of responses for other questions is generally above 9,000 responses.

Margin of Error

Because only a sample of the full population was interviewed, all results are subject to margin of error, meaning that not all differences are statistically significant.

For example, in a question where 50% (the worst case scenario as far as margin of error is concerned) gave a particular answer, with a sample of 2006 it is 95% certain that the 'true' value will fall within the range of 2.2% from the sample result.

Subsamples will be subject to higher margin of error, conclusions drawn from tables with very small sub-samples should be treated with caution.

Estimates are based on data excluding respondents from the ethnic or religious group asked about (for instance questions asking about a close relative marrying a Muslim are based on responses from non-Muslim respondents). Questions about a person from a given country were asked to all respondents.

Figures for each local authority area are estimates for non-minority residents of that local authority who on average resemble the demographic characteristics of that local authority area.

Where the minority asked about is a very small proportion of the population then the estimate provided will be a good guide to both opinion amongst the non-minority population of the area, and opinion amongst the general population of the area.

Where the minority asked about is a larger proportion of the population (for instance Muslim respondents in some parts of Birmingham and London), then the estimate should be taken with additional caution for estimating non-minority opinion where the overall demographic profile radically differs between minority and non-minority groups.

Not all questions will have necessarily been asked to all respondents – this is because they may be only appropriate to certain demographic groups (i.e: excluding members of the group asked about).

Respondents answering "Don't Know" to a question have been excluded from estimates of that question.

Data were analysed and weighted by Dr Chris Hanretty, Royal Holloway (University of London) on behalf of Suration.

For further information please contact:

Research Team

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The Woolf Institute's vision is one in which discussion and engagement overcome prejudice and intolerance. It combines teaching, research and outreach, focusing on Jews, Christians and Muslims, to foster understanding between people of diverse beliefs and improve the way that people live together in society.

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